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FOR CONTEMPLATION IN TIME OF WAR

Editor's note: The reader is referred to the announcement of the Rockefeller Commission of the American Philosophical Association, reproduced in this issue. The task of the Commission, "to reexamine thoroughly the nature and function of philosophy in higher education and in general culture," provides the motif of this and the following article. Their aim is to expound the Christian ideal of higher learning, not as it must here or there be modified for extrinsic reasons, but in itself. Accordingly, the first article treats of the intellectual life: its nature, its pertinence in a contemporary warring society, its place in the full Christian wisdom. The second article describes the distinct but not-to-be-separated complement of natural wisdom, sacred theology. Conclusions are drawn with particular reference to current practice in university education.

THE PEOPLE of America and of the United Nations are waging a hard, cruel, bloody global war. Most of the people of these nations are making heroic sacrifices of their labor, pleasure, money and even of their lives. Millions are unflinchingly facing death and freely pouring out their life's blood. And by most these sacrifices are being gladly made for a grand ideal. We are fighting for the four great freedoms: freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. Now being adults with the use of our God-given reason and intelligence, and not being fools, if we are willing to make every sacrifice even unto the laying down of life itself, then we must imply that those principles for which we are willing to die must be worth life itself, must be greater than life, and that robbed of these principles life itself would be without meaning and value. These principles must contain the end of human life and the means that are absolutely necessary for the attainment of that end. As good Americans we subscribe, as we have it in the Declaration of Independence, to the self-evident truth that the Creator in destining man to his human end has endowed him with certain inalienable rights, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, for the guarantee and protection of which governments themselves were instituted.

FREEDOM AND THE FREEDOMS

Unless these four freedoms are to be but catch phrases, blinding instruments of mere propaganda, which unscrupulous demagogues may use to make us rob ourselves of the fruit of our sweat and blood, we must clearly and unequivocally understand the meaning of these phrases. Freedom is a positive thing, not merely negative. It does not mean something undetermined, unrestrained, lawless, and without responsibility. It does mean self-determination, self-restraint without coercion and without obstacle and hindrance from without. It means the observance of law, because law is the ordination of reason; it

means the responsibility that springs from the clear intellectual perception of the intrinsic dignity of the person and the consequent recognition that the rectitude of his actions depends on their being ordered to an exalted end. Freedom of worship, then, might be defined as the right or inviolable moral power of the individual person to know, to praise, to love, and to serve the true God, not as and whether he wishes, but as he ought. We say true God, because man being an intellectual being, has an intellectual faculty ordered to truth and a free faculty of choice ordered to the good. The false and the evil can never be the end of man and hence he cannot be obligated by his very nature but to the true and the good. And hence it follows that he can never have a right to evil or to ignorance and error, since every right is based upon an obligation. We surely do not intend to permit the leaders of the Axis Powers to go free to continue unmolested in their assumed right to worship their god, the state and a master race, by the sacrifice and immolation of the liberty of others.

The second freedom, the freedom of speech, is the right of the person to seek and to express in word or writing, the truth. By this freedom we do not intend to relax our laws against slander, lying propaganda, false advertising, defrauding, and all other kinds of deceit and falsehood and error. We do not intend to open our asylums and leave society a prey to those who are incurably incapable of truth. And therefore the freedom of speech does not mean the right to say or write anything one wishes, but to speak and write and seek the truth.

These two freedoms express the rights to the highest and most proper operations of man. These operations are characteristic and peculiar to man; he alone of all beings in this world has religion and the power of speech. Since the end of every thing is the exercise of its proper activity, these two freedoms contain the end of man. The other two freedoms, which are expressed as freedom *from*, freedom from fear and freedom from want, indicate the necessary conditions for attaining that end. They demand the removal and destruction of those things that threaten and prevent the free exercise of those activities that lead to the end. Fear is the motion of the appetite, rational or sensitive, by which we recoil from threatening danger or evil. Freedom from fear will consist in the destruction of those things or forces which menace the goods of mind, body, family, and external possessions that are necessary for the proper and decent living of human life. Want is the absence or deficiency of the necessary means to lead the full human life, whether they be the goods of soul, of mind, of body, of reputation, of family, or of temporal possessions. Freedom from want is the right of the person to the opportunity to acquire these necessary means. Thus these four freedoms might be summarized: the right to live as men.

ENEMIES OF FREEDOM

Because these rights have been threatened from without by a powerful enemy, we are sacrificing our blood, our lives, our all, in a horrible war. But there can be—and there is—a greater threat to these same freedoms from within. A crushing defeat from without can impair and cripple men's freedom, but it cannot completely destroy it if men are resolved to be free. We have only to remember Poland, Holland, Belgium, a great part of France, Jugoslavia, and the rest, to understand the truth of this. But men can be robbed completely of freedom by their own stupidity, by their ignorance and false philosophies, by the sophistic propaganda of scheming and unscrupulous dictators. Men can be robbed of their freedom to act as men by prostituting their sacred right to perverted ends, to error, and to evil. Man can be deprived of the freedom to act as befits human dignity by stepping down from his high station to live the life of the beast, wallowing in mere sensual gratification, or to live the life of the vegetable, which is merely to grow strong and physically beautiful. He can lose his freedom if, in the practical things that are necessary, he becomes so interested and engrossed in the means and the useful that he loses sight of the end, and mistakes the means for the end. When these things happen, men lose not only their freedom but also their love and desire for that freedom; they become willing slaves of dictators, governments, ignorance and error, the passions, the machines, the wealth, and all the other means that have stolen away their liberty. It is often asked how our enemies, who are men like ourselves, can not only submit themselves to the loss of freedom, but also give their lives with a certain kind of fanatical heroism to defend and preserve their own slavery and to extend it to all mankind. The answer lies in their false worship of false gods: the master race and the Son of Heaven. They are a terrible warning of the degree to which lying propaganda and false philosophies, the brutalizing influence of the breakup of the home, the national regimentation of men, the *training of individuals* as cogs in an efficient machine to the exclusion of the *education of men*, can eradicate the thought and the love of liberty from the hearts of men.

We are engaged in a difficult and sanguine war against external enemies that threaten us from without, and our hope of final victory is firmly founded. But our very effort to stem these external forces of evil may rob us of the fruits of victory; for there are even greater enemies from within. Of the nations that fell before the onrushing power of aggressors, some were not so much crushed by the arms and might of the warrior enemy as they were crumbled from the rottenness and corruption within. The love of freedom that becomes a mere love of license cannot inspire to acts of heroic sacrifice. A nation for whom freedom *of* religion becomes freedom *from* religion

will be an idolatrous nation; will worship itself even with human sacrifice. Practitioners of birth control and abortion, of easy divorce, infidelity and dishonesty, will make up a perfidious nation that will spurn the sanctity of treaties. And a nation whose members prostitute themselves to the enjoyment of sensuous animal pleasure will be a barbaric nation, uncouth and savage and ruthless, ruled by the law of the jungle. A nation of men whose thoughts and aspirations rise not above the smooth working of the assembly line will be a nation of automatons and efficient slaves. Only a nation of men who live as men can be a free nation, civilized and cultured, a mercy and a blessing to the bleeding world.

In our very effort, we may be distracted from our noble aims. We may be tempted to sacrifice, to secure victory more quickly and safely and to shorten the war, the very ends for which we fight, and the absolutely necessary conditions under which these ends can be secured. Blindly and unwittingly we may allow the irreparable break down of family life; we may without hope of recovery permit our free institutions of learning and education to become mere training schools for jobs to be done. Inconsistently we may temporize with expediency to shorten the war and lessen the loss of life, forgetting that we could have avoided the war itself and all its bloodshed if we were but willing to sacrifice these four freedoms. Our greatest menace can be unthinking and unscrupulous leaders who, moved by political ambition and greed for power, can by a compromising peace rob us of the hard-earned fruits of our military effort. Our greatest and most dangerous enemies are those false teachers that steal from us the purpose of our endeavor by telling us that there is no truth and that it does not matter what we know or what we believe—those false teachers that strip man of his high dignity and level him to the status of a higher animal. In this crisis we need—just as much or more than we need fighting men—thinkers who know the truth, God-fearing men and women, educators to preserve our free institutions for the coming generation; we need fathers and mothers who will sacrifice everything to keep the home; we need a nation of men and women who can think straight, and live as men should live. There is heroism and patriotism in the life of man *as man*—heroism and patriotism without which the heroic sacrifice of blood and life will be betrayed.

SOURCE OF FREEDOM: THE LIFE OF MAN *AS MAN*

How are we to live as men? Man is a complex being and his potential activities are many. Which ones must he do in order to live as a man? For it would seem that all these activities belong to a man.

The proper activity of a being, says Aristotle—and he is followed in this by St. Thomas and the other great Scholastic thinkers—is the

end of each thing. This proper activity is indicated by the specific difference of the thing in question. Thus a truck is intended to transport heavy loads of material from one place to another. This is its proper activity and its end. It has many other activities; for example, in the engine there are explosions of gasoline, the motion and recoil of the pistons, the turning of shafts and gears. But all this activity is ordered to the proper one of moving the load. If a truck just has explosions of gasoline, it is not a good truck, because it does not accomplish its end and is lacking in its proper activity. So in man. He differs from all other beings in this material universe in that he understands and chooses both the end and the means of his activity; he has an intellect and a free will. Hence to understand truth and to love what he understands is the proper activity of man. All other activities must be ordered to this function as to an end. Thus, in him sensation, sensuous appetite, vegetable growth, chemical and physical activity, are all ordered to each other and finally to man's highest activity. For man to make any one of these activities his end would make him comparable to the truck whose sole activity is explosions.

The highest end of man, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, must consist in the highest act of his highest faculty acting according to its highest virtue and with respect to its highest object. Now man's highest faculty is his intellect and therefore his highest act must be the act of understanding. But the intellect has three virtues or good operative habits which perfect it and make it not only capable of its operation but render that operation easy, perfect, and pleasurable—namely, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. These are speculative virtues and are higher than the practical virtues of prudence and art which are essentially subordinated to the things which by nature they are ordered to produce: prudence, to regulate and order man's own actions to his proper end; art, to regulate the productions of things—whether those things be produced in matter outside himself or in powers within himself.¹ Knowledge, which has to do with reasoning and demonstration—which are ordered to conclusions—cannot be the highest; nor can understanding, since it deals with first principles which are obscure and implicit. Wisdom, by which we know things not only in themselves but in all their relations with the sum total of all other reality as dependent and ordered in being, is the highest of the intellectual virtues. "The function of the wise man," says St. Thomas, "is to order all things in truth as they are ordered in reality."² Man's highest act of wisdom is contemplation: the penetrating intellectual gaze into the truth and reality of a thing. The highest object

¹ Thus the arts are distinguished into the liberal arts, whose end is the production of a perfection within the man, and the fine and mechanical arts, whose end is the production of something in matter.

² *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 1.

of this contemplation is God because He is infinite truth and infinite reality and because He is the first source of the truth and reality of all other objects and the ultimate end to which all reality and truth is ordered; because only in relation to Him do all other things have intelligibility, reality, meaning, and value.

The ultimate end of man and his absolute perfection consists in the contemplation of God. The intuitive and penetrating intellectual gaze upon the essence of God is the Beatific Vision in which we will see Him face to face as He is in Himself. This vision however cannot be attained in this life, but the contemplation of God even here can be begun dispositively and inchoatively by the contemplation of the effects of God's wisdom and power. This contemplation St. Thomas calls the contemplation of truth.

END OF LIFE: THE CONTEMPLATION OF TRUTH

In question one hundred and eighty of the *Secunda Secundae* of the *Summa Theologica* the Angelic Doctor enumerates six species or kinds of this contemplation of truth proper to man in this life on earth.³ They represent six levels in our manner of contemplation as we ascend to the contemplation of God Himself. The first is the contemplation of sensible things; the second is more penetrating, a movement and progression from the sensible to the intelligible and spiritual and universal. The third degree consists in the judging of the sensible according to absolute intelligible principles. The fourth is the consideration of the deeper intelligible reality itself which underlies sensible being. The fifth is the contemplation of truth and reality which is above sense and transcends it but can be grasped by reason and the natural human intellect. The sixth is the contemplation of divine truth which exceeds and surpasses the power of the natural human intellect. Its object is the divine truth which we receive from God's supernatural revelation. This contemplation proceeds from the infused virtue of faith and the infused gifts of understanding and wisdom; it is the most sublime of all contemplation of divine truth and in it contemplation finds its ultimate perfection in this life.

Contemplation of truth, then, is the end and proper activity of man in this life here on earth. To this all other duties and activities are ordered as to their end.⁴ All other human activities, rights, and obligations are either necessary means and conditions, or they promote and facilitate contemplation.⁵ St. Thomas sets down three necessary conditions: health of body, dominion over inordinate passion and the withdrawal from exterior activity.⁶ Thus the acquisition and practice of the moral virtues are absolutely necessary, as is a certain *habit* of contemplation which is acquired by repetition.⁷

³ *S. T.*, II-II. 180. 4 ad 3.

⁴ *Sum. c. Gent.*, III. 25.

⁵ *S. T.*, II-II. 180. 2; *Sum. c. Gent.*, III. 37.

⁶ *S. T.*, II-II. 180. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 180. 4.

This contemplation is called by St. Thomas the contemplation of wisdom because it must proceed from the virtue of wisdom. To gaze penetratingly upon a thing is to look deeper than appearances into the reality and truth of that thing. To grasp understandingly the beauty and truth and goodness of a thing, its value, we must have a standard of comparison, a norm of judgment. We must understand not only the thing in itself but that thing in relation to its principles and its ends and to all other reality. This is to see a thing as it really is, because all being is related, united, and ordered. This ordering is the function of the virtue of wisdom. "The wise man orders all things in truth, as they are ordered in reality."⁸

For the Christian and for all men, since man is created in a supernatural state and destined to a supernatural end, this guiding wisdom must be a union of the natural and acquired virtue—whose objects are the visible and naturally intelligible things and the principles of being that are known to us through the light of natural reason—with the supernatural and infused virtue of faith and the gift of wisdom, whose objects are the revealed word of God.⁹

THE TRUTH CONTEMPLATED

This norm or standard arrived at by the union of the activities of the natural and the supernatural virtues of wisdom, from reason and from revelation, might thus be briefly summarized: From all eternity there exists a God, subsistent being, eternal and immutable, immense, absolutely simple and infinitely perfect, truth and goodness and beauty itself, all wise and loving, all powerful, living the fullness of the divine life of intelligence and love and infinite beatitude in the Three Divine Persons. And in this Godhead there is the Word, the Son of God, the perfect Image and Manifestation of the divine and infinite riches of God to God. In this Word by which God sees and loves His divine excellence, He also understands the possibility of manifesting this majestic treasure to others besides Himself. "The procession of the Word from the Father," says St. Thomas, "gives the order and the manner of the procession of creatures from God." And by this all powerful Word, He creates all being, diversified and distinct in its natures and individuals, and yet one in ultimate principle, exemplar, and end; not the perfect unity of simplicity and identification, but the one of composition and order and subordination.

And yet the divine riches of the Word are not exhausted. In that

⁸ *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 1.

⁹ Cf. *S. T.*, I. 1. For a further discussion of this relation between the natural and supernatural wisdom, see J. J. O'Brien, "On the Pursuit of Catholic Wisdom," *The Modern Schoolman*, XVIII (1941), 24-27; B. J. Muller-Thym, "St. Thomas and the Recapturing of Natural Wisdom," *ibid.*, 64-68; "Problems of Philosophy to be Stressed in the Undergraduate Curriculum," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Educational Association*, August, 1940, p. 300; J. J. O'Brien, "St. Thomas Aquinas' Synthesis of Catholic Wisdom," *St. Louis University Studies in Honor of St. Thomas Aquinas*, I (1943), 3-7.

Word He sees and through that Word He creates a being that unites in itself all the perfection of the universe; a being that is the very image of God, in that it has intelligence that can look upon this universe and understand its truth, penetrate its mysteries, comprehend its order and its beauty, and thus be led to a knowledge of the majesty of God; a being that is capable, through the possession of free will, of loving service and adoration of God and of the possession of His goodness in its participation by the things that are made. But in this creature, man, the likeness of the Word is even more perfect; in him somehow God's gifts transcend even creaturehood: for He communicates a participation in the very life and nature of Himself, by which man can see God face to face, and know Him as He is in Himself, and can love God and be loved by Him with the love of friendship. Man is by grace a son of God.

And when by sin man destroyed the effects of God's work, disrupted the order of the universe and of himself, God restored His creation; not by again assimilating this masterpiece to His word, not as an artist merely fashioning the materials to the idea in His mind; but—if that were possible—like an artist who breathes the living idea into that masterpiece, so God put His Word into His creation, "and the Word became flesh and dwelt amongst us." And by that act, creation attained its end in a manner that was far beyond its natural powers to accomplish: it not only extrinsically manifested the perfections of God in a finite manner, and participated and shared in His goodness; it contained the perfect, invisible Manifestation and Image of God, the Son of God made flesh.

THE FUNCTION OF NATURAL WISDOM

This *summa* is largely taken from the revealed word of God, the presentation of which belongs to sacred theology. But it must be brought down to the natural reality and activity of human life by philosophical speculation. For philosophy and theology, though distinct, are not to be separated and divorced. My body and my soul are distinct; if they are separated, I am dead. The God of revelation is also the God of subsistent being and infinite perfection, Jahweh, the pure act of being, He who created the universe and nature and ordered the world. It is the man of intellect and free will, of sensation and sensitive appetite, of vital processes, that is elevated to the sonship of God by grace. Unless philosophical contemplation of truth presents a synthesis of being—its principles, its end, its exemplar, its unity, its composition, its order, its subordination, the order and relations in the life of man—the truths of revelation will remain outside of life, detached and inoperative. Only by means of an integrated intellectual life can these great truths be made to permeate and inform and elevate and live in every greatest and least act of life, even as

the divinity of the Son of God raised the making of a crude plough to the redemption of the world. Only an intellectual soul can participate in the divine life of grace; only a natural intellect can be infused with the virtu  of faith; only natural wisdom can be perfected by the infused gift of wisdom. And the function of wisdom is to order all things to one; because reality and truth are one, at least by order. Wisdom does not know and understand and judge any reality as isolated, as in itself and absolute; it cognizes all being in all its relations with the sum total of all other being and reality—as related in cause and end and likeness to the Pure Act of Being—because reality is related to all other being and is a participation in the truth and goodness and beauty of the Absolute.

Contemplation consists of three distinct acts in this order of ascending importance. The first, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ is reading. We must get in touch with the thought and wisdom of the great minds of the ages. The second is thoughtful meditation and reflection. The third is prayer or communion with God. Thus freedom of worship and freedom of speech, the right to live and act as a man, are fulfilled perfectly by wisdom's contemplation of truth.

CONCLUSION

We are waging a hard and gigantic war. This makes contemplation difficult, since the conditions of contemplation are peace, the harmonious functioning of human activity in the state, and freedom from external occupation. And therefore war is an evil. We must fight against its evil influence with the same effort that we put into the war itself, lest the war effort be in vain. This is even as necessary for the fighting men as it is for those on the home front. Fighting is not the proper activity of men; it has been thrust upon us to defend our rights to act as men. We must, then, fight as men and die as men, free men who choose the end because of its sublimity and freely choose the means because of that exalted end. A martyr to a cause is not one who merely dies for the cause; a martyr is primarily a witness who sheds his blood in testimony of the truth whose beauty he has gazed upon.

But if war is an evil, it is an evil from which good can be drawn. Its horror, its brutality, its suffering, its sacrifice, its heroism—all these can give us an intellectual realization of the immense value of the things for which we fight. If we think correctly and work and fight and die as men, we will appreciate, as no other thing can teach us to appreciate, the fruit of our sweat and blood and tears: the right to live and act as men.

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¹⁰ S. T., II-II. 180. 3 ad 4.

THEOLOGY AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

A STRIKING FEATURE of American university life is the dissatisfaction with which leading educators view the higher learning in its contemporary condition. University presidents and professors disagree about many things, but they seem to concur in the realization that the present situation is bad. Not all are as vocal as President Hutchins of Chicago, or the apologists of the St. John's experiment; but most of them, if those who publicly express their judgments may be taken as representative of the group, share in the discontent.

They do well to be dissatisfied. University education is as wretched as President Hutchins depicts it in *The Higher Learning in America*. Secularized education on the university level is bad because it is unrealistic. Catholic education on the same level, to the extent that it willingly or unwillingly reflects the character of non-Catholic universities, is vitiated by the same defects.

When I say that secularized university education is unrealistic, I mean that it has a false norm of values, and especially that its idea of man does not correspond to reality. Real, concrete, historical man is man raised to the supernatural order, with a supernatural destiny. Since this is a fact, any education that ignores or rejects this order and destiny must necessarily be unrealistic. The concept of a purely natural human life is a mental abstraction; it is unreal. There is no such thing, and there never was. Human life is either supernatural, if it is vitalized by divine life, or it is subnatural, if it is deprived of that life.

Further, I contend that proposals thus far advanced to improve university education are reactionary. They are reactionary because they seek their inspiration from an old, outmoded ideal of man: the ideal of man as he was thought of prior to the Incarnation of the Son of God. This ancient time was a time of preparation; to go back to a time of preparation after the fulfillment has been accomplished, is purely and simply reactionary, with all the overtones of that opprobrious term.

In this article I shall dare to be radical, realistic, and objective. I shall largely prescind from considerations of present expediency and immediate practicability, partly because I have been invited to do so by the editor of this journal, partly because I think reality should be insisted upon to the exclusion of other considerations, and partly because the time comes when compromise grows intolerable.

This is my thesis: true education on its higher plane—and the same is true of any learning, though I am here concerned with university

education—is education which looks upon human society in its concrete existence and its historical career. It happens, by the grace of God, that concrete society is made up of individuals raised to the supernatural order. Hence true education must regard man as living in the supernatural order, with a supernatural destiny. The discipline which alone views actual man realistically is the science of the supernatural, or theology. From this fact the function of theology in university education is readily deducible.

To achieve my objective I shall first endeavor to outline the nature of theology as it is in itself; then I shall briefly point out some relations between theology and other sciences; and finally I shall make applications to university education.

WHAT THEOLOGY IS

The theology of which there is question in this article is not that natural theology which is the apex of metaphysics, and which treats of God as the first Being and the cause of all other being, to the extent that reason can arrive at a knowledge of Him from creatures. Theology, as the term is here employed, is sacred theology, the science of God as derived from revelation. This science treats of God not only as He is the first Being, the self-subsistent Being, the cause of all being, but as He is in His intimate life.

What theology knows it has learned in the first instance from God Himself. It accepts its principles on the authority of the Truth which is incapable of falsehood or error. These principles are accepted on faith; all other truths of which theology treats are of the nature of conclusions from these principles. From this it is evident that sacred theology is a higher science than any other, including metaphysics, because it proceeds from higher principles.¹

But theology is not exclusively the knowledge of these principles; it is not exclusively the science of the faith that has been formally revealed; nor is it restricted to the knowledge of conclusions derived from what has been revealed. Rather, in accordance with the constant language of theologians, it is the science which has as its object the explanation, reasoned justification, and study of all the truths which God has revealed, together with the manifold inter-relations and necessary consequences of these truths.²

So conceived, theology is seen to be essentially different from a science which is supplementary to theology, and which is known as apologetics, or fundamental theology. The function of this supple-

¹ St. Thomas, *In Boetium de Trinitate*, 2. 2.

² For a brief account of a modern altercation concerning the notion and object of theology, cf. Charles Boyer, S.J., "Qu'est-ce que la théologie," *Gregorianum*, XXI (1940), 255-266.

mentary, or indeed, preliminary science, is to establish the fact that God has communicated a revelation to mankind through His Son, Jesus Christ, and that He has entrusted that revelation to His Church. The science of apologetics rests exclusively upon reason, and demonstrates the fact, the authenticity, and infallible truth of the divine testimony, source of our faith and principle of theology. Theology, already in possession of the truths revealed, rests upon the divine testimony as made known by Scripture and Tradition faithfully interpreted in accordance with the infallible decisions of the teaching Church. Apologetic science points out, specifies the organs which transmit divine revelation; but satisfied with knowing and showing them, it does not examine the content of their message. Theology on the contrary studies, analyses, interprets, co-ordinates and systematizes the truths comprised in this content.

This entire content, as gradually constructed into a science by theologians in the course of centuries, either presents, or is derived from the truths which God knows and has communicated to man. Thus the first principle of theology is the knowledge God has of Himself, and of other beings in their relation to Him as their first cause and last end.

Hence theological science has God Himself as its proper object. All other beings have a place in theology only in terms of the knowledge, revealed to man, which God has of them, and of His intentions concerning them, inasmuch as they are His work which proceed from Him as their efficient and exemplary cause, and revert to Him as their final cause.

The corpus of truths organized into the science of theology is enormous. To present a summary of them St. Thomas required five large volumes. The main truths, as systematized by theological science, may be roughly sketched as follows, in a manner that is necessarily defective.

The one, infinite, eternal God, the Supreme Being, the *ens a se* towards which metaphysics gropes, is not merely intelligent and free, but is a God of infinite fecundity, a God who communicates His indivisible nature to Persons equal to Himself. God the Father is the principle of the Son by generation, Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit by spiration. The Trinity is the summit of revelation and theology, the greatest of truths, for it is the source and pinnacle of all truth. To know the Trinity, to contemplate it, the angels were created, and on earth, men.

The living God wills to communicate His goodness; He creates. But in creating He crowns His work with a finality that transcends all the natural potency and aspirations of created beings. He raises His rational creatures to His own sphere, He destines them to His

own eternal life, to the life of knowledge and love proper to Himself; not only to an imitation, but literally to a *participation* in His own nature, by the infusion of a gift wholly gratuitous, *gratia*, a real entity, a permanent spiritual quality that supernaturalizes, or, in the language of the Fathers, *deifies* spiritual natures; in a word, sanctifying grace.

Such is the divine plan. God created rational nature and elevated it; or better, He created it elevated to participation in His own life.

This participation in the divine life was destroyed by sin. The supernatural destiny remained; but the corresponding means, confided to the father of the race and wilfully rejected by him, were lost for his posterity. The inestimable treasure of divine life, which should have been transmitted along with nature, no longer existed among men.

Infected with this original sin, men were no longer born in the state that God willed for the human race. By a further consequence, men succumb to the concupiscence that solicits them; their own free acts lead them to personal sins. The privation of the divine life, the severance of the supernatural union with God conferred by participation in the divine nature, is followed by eternal loss of God after death.

This was an irremediable catastrophe for the whole human race; because of it the human race remained deprived of sanctifying grace. But God, in the prodigality of His love, did not suffer the race to remain in this state. In His divine plan he wished men to be everlasting happy and deified. By the highest and most intimate supernatural communication of God outside Himself, the Son of God united to Himself a human nature, and re-established the supernatural union of mankind with God by the redemption.

All men are summoned to recover divine life. Only a part of mankind consents; these form the Church. Through the sacrament of regeneration each individual is to be reborn to participation in the divine nature; all the sacraments are designed to prepare or develop divine life; the Eucharist especially is the means of the closest union of men with the God-Man and through Him with God. The glorification and transfiguration of man in soul, when admitted to the beatific vision in heaven, and in body also, after the general resurrection, is the consummation of his participation in the divine nature.

Hence we may describe theology, in terms of its content, as the science of the divine life: the divine life that is God Himself, the life of divine cognition by which the Father generates the Son, the life of the mutual love of Father and Son, which terminates in the Holy Spirit; the divine life that God willed to communicate to rational creatures; the divine life that was lost to the human family by sin, that was restored by Christ and is possessed by union with Christ; the divine life that exists germinally in sanctifying grace, that is preceded or

accompanied by aids called actual graces, that is caused, developed, or restored by the sacraments, and that finally flowers into the beatification which is the supreme communication of divine life to the blessed, who thereupon lead for eternity the life proper to God Himself, the life of direct knowledge of God, corresponding love, and consequent beatitude.

Such in brief is theology, queen of sciences. It is a proper, independent science, essentially distinct from philosophy and all other sciences; for it has not only its own theological principle of cognition, the revealed word of God, but also its own exclusively theological sphere, God as He is in Himself, as the center of the supernatural order, and as the principle and end of the communication of His nature.³

RELATION OF THEOLOGY TO OTHER SCIENCES

A correct understanding of the nature of theology enables us to evaluate its position in the hierarchy of sciences. The excellence of a science is gauged, objectively, by the dignity of its subject matter, and subjectively, by the perfection of the certitude with which it is possessed. No other science can approach theology in the verification of these conditions.⁴

If we consider a science objectively, its perfection consists in the universality, unification, and sublimity of its subject matter; for any system is perfect in proportion to the multitude and excellence of the items that constitute it, and the order by which they are unified. Theology embraces *all* things in heaven and on earth, the natural as well as the supernatural, although the former only with respect to the latter, and hence the most *sublime* objects. Primarily it contemplates the supreme and most simple unity, the divine Being, and secondarily all other things, inasmuch as they are taken up into union with this Being. Its proper object is first and foremost the Trinity of divine Persons in Their unity, and the union of all creatures with God and among themselves. By reason of its subject matter, therefore, theology is the most universal, unified, and sublime science that can be conceived.

The subjective perfection of a science is the perfection of the cognition by which the system is known. This perfection depends on three factors: (1) on the logical connection between the individual truths and their reducibility to the fewest possible principles, (2) on the certitude of these principles themselves, (3) on the coincidence of the cognitive principles with the real principles or real foundations of the system.

³ Cf. M. J. Scheeben, *Die Mysterien des Christentums* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1941), pp. 618-623.

⁴ St. Thomas, *S.T.*; I. 1. 5.

Unquestionably it pertains to the perfection of a science that the entire complexus of its conclusions can be reduced to the fewest possible principles, and that thus a formal unity in the mind of the knower can be established. This is the case in theology, no less than in philosophy. If we consult the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, we find that in almost every section he places at the beginning a single truth of faith, from which, as from a premise, he proceeds with rigorous consistency to infer all the truths concerning the topic in question. Thus in the *Prima Secundae* he proceeds from the supernatural destiny of man as his principle to the beatific vision as his end, in order scientifically to adduce all the truths concerning man's progress toward God, and bases thereon his entire doctrine on the virtues, the supernatural law, and grace.

Only in one detail does theology seem, at first sight, to rank below other sciences: the principles, the fundamental truths from which it proceeds are not known by intrinsic evidence, but are accepted on faith. That the principles of theology are not evidentially known, but must be believed, is accounted for by their ineffable sublimity, not by any uncertainty or unreliability. Because of this sublimity they can be known clearly and evidently only by God, who is subsistent Intelligence, and by those who are admitted to the beatific vision. But even in our present state we have greater certitude of them than we have of the principles of philosophy itself, because they are vouched for by God's own inerrant knowledge and veracity. Accordingly, since in any science there is as much question of the certitude as of the evidence of the principles, the higher certitude in theology amply compensates for the deficiency in intrinsic evidence.

Above all, the perfection of a science depends on a perception of the ultimate reasons for the several truths. In philosophy our intellects mount to a knowledge of the first cause only from its effects. But in theology the case is otherwise. In theology the ultimate principle of cognition is identical with the ultimate principle of being; the *ens a se* is subsistent Intelligence. God knows immediately the ultimate reason, the foundation of all things, namely His own Being, and perceives how they proceed therefrom by His free will. By faith we do not, of course, attain to an intuitive knowledge, but we do participate in God's intuitive vision of Himself, and thus we are enabled to survey the entire range of theological truths from their center, and also the entire domain of natural beings, in so far as these are illuminated by supernatural revelation. God has revealed to us the interrelation of the natural and supernatural orders, together with their causes, particularly their final and exemplary causes; and from these we can infer, if not all details, at least the principal truths of the supernatural order. God's ultimate exemplar and end in the plan and execution of His activity is His own Being, His own essence; and

from this essence, as exhibited to us by revelation, we understand how and why God has ordained the designs of His wisdom as He has, and not otherwise. Thus by faith we struggle through to the eternal reasons of all temporal things, the reasons that comprise, besides the source, also the norm and motive of the structure of the universe.

Thus faith, which at first sight seems to negate science, actually establishes us in the possession of the most eminent of all sciences, since by faith we share in God's own science, and transcend all creation, so as to attain to the summit of all being, and from there to command a view of all things in their utmost harmony and unity.

Accordingly theology is the most sublime and precious science of all, and is the wisdom that towers over all human wisdom.⁵ To a degree impossible to any other science, it fulfills the conditions usually associated with wisdom. It is concerned primarily not with creatures, but with God, and with creatures only so far as they are placed in relationship with God, proceed from Him, and are united with Him. It perceives and judges all things according to the most basic and certain truths, according to their ultimate principles and supreme ends. It regards the temporal in the light of the eternal, in terms of the eternal designs of God. To the dweller in time theology displays his own ultimate and supreme destiny, points out the road that leads to it, and hence instructs him to regulate his life and activity in the wisest manner.

At bottom, theology is all this because it flows from the source of all wisdom, the divine wisdom, more directly and in purer and fuller flood than all the other sciences.

An insight into the nature of theology readily leads to an appreciation of the relationship between the two factors, faith and reason, that work together for the generation of theological knowledge. This relationship has often been expressed in a formula against which non-scholastic thinkers have a special grievance: "philosophy is the handmaid of theology." The many misunderstandings occasioned by the metaphorical cast of this proposition can be corrected only by an accurate determination of its meaning. Like all figurative expressions, the metaphor is defective, but it does serve in some respects to illustrate the relationship between the two principles of cognition, natural reason and supernatural faith, as well as their respective activities. To what extent is philosophy the handmaid of theology, or more precisely, to what extent is reason the handmaid of faith?

First of all, natural reason is, in dignity and power, a lower cognitive principle than faith; it ranks below faith both in the range and inerrancy of its illumination. Faith reaches as far as the communication of the divine knowledge, and participates in its infallibility; it

⁵ St. Thomas, *S.T.*; I. 1. 6.

represents the divine reason as opposed to the human reason. Hence the subordination of reason to faith arises as soon as reason and faith are placed in a real relationship; otherwise there is no question of such subordination.

Therefore when man is called to faith or actually receives it, reason has to work for faith and in dependence on faith, the higher principle, and to this extent has to serve faith, or be its "handmaid."

Reason has to work for faith in two ways: to prepare the soul for the advent of faith and, after faith has taken possession, to bring about an understanding and development of its content. Thus reason serves theological knowledge by helping to confer it both in its principle and in its development.

Reason prepares for faith by exploring the natural order upon which the supernatural order is constructed, and from which must be acquired the notions which are to be applied, analogously, to the conception of the supernatural order. Further, reason precedes faith in order to convince the intellect of the actuality and authenticity of the supernatural revelation, and hence of its credibility and of the obligation of belief in it. Because of man's supernatural elevation, reason is no longer confined to the investigation of the natural order, but is called upon to prepare the way for faith and utilize its natural knowledge as a pattern for the higher knowledge which comes with faith. Because of this elevation, further, reason may not ignore the facts by which revelation comes to its attention, but must ponder them carefully, so as thereby to open the soul to faith.

Once faith has entered in, reason is called upon to exert itself in behalf of faith in order to exploit the full wealth of its content. Indeed, reason must strive more to promote the development of faith than its own development, since the object of faith is immeasurably more worthy and sublime than its own proper object. Therefore reason must place its own metaphysical concepts at the disposal of faith, and must endeavor to elucidate the subject matter of faith by applying to it whatever is analogously applicable in its own concepts, as it does, for instance, when it employs its concept of the soul, the principle of life in the natural order, to illustrate and illuminate sanctifying grace, the principle of supernatural life. Further, reason must devote its associative and discursive powers to the task of discovering the interconnection of the truths of faith, and of unfolding all the wealth of consequences potentially contained in these truths.

Obviously the reason, by being assigned to this higher office, does not forego the right of working for itself; indeed, it can serve faith efficiently only by a full development of itself. Still less is it deprived of the physical power of exercising its own activity just as before; rather, its higher calling confers upon it a new power, of surmounting its own natural domain. The same living intellect receives the reports

of both natural and supernatural sources, and unifies them; and because of this meeting the two kinds of knowledge are mutually intensified and extended.

Hence faith by no means curtails the reason's natural range of activity, but opens up a vaster and higher domain for its exercise. The only restriction placed upon reason is that it is restrained from setting up errors against faith, from accepting falsehood for truth. The real liberty and autonomy of reason, its freedom to search for untarnished truth, is but the more firmly secured by the co-reign of faith over its domain; a liberty that is assured not only in that the reason is guarded against pronouncing judgment contrary to the infallible authority of faith, but is stimulated to make the data of faith the goal of its own investigations, and thus more fruitfully to gather truth by and for itself.⁶ It is because of this co-reign that scholastic philosophy is true philosophy, the *philosophia perennis*. Theology does not destroy, dilute, or supplant philosophy, but permits it to realize its full potentialities; just as grace does not destroy nature, but exalts and fecundates it. The *ancilla theologiae* is not degraded and enslaved, but elevated and consecrated by the higher wisdom.⁷

THE PLACE OF THEOLOGY IN UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

My immediate purpose in discussing the nature and insisting on the importance of theology is obvious: it has not only a place, but the chief place, in any scheme of university education that is worthy of the name. This truth is irrefutable: high above all the sciences, high above all philosophy, towers the majestic science of the theology of revelation. The human mind was made for truth, to perceive things as they are; and it is unreasonable to pretend that they are not as they are. Christ is not only the High Priest and King of kings, but is for all times the supreme *Teacher* of men. And as any teacher conveys to his pupils the knowledge he himself possesses, so Christ propounds the knowledge personally possessed by God; and this knowledge, as communicated to man and put into a system, plus the unfolding of the further truths virtually contained in revealed propositions, is theology.

If, then, a university is, as Newman argues, an institution that "by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge,"⁸ if the purpose of a university is, in the words of a contemporary educator, "to provide a haven where the search for truth may go on unhampered by utility or pressure for 'results,'"⁹ if the primary concern of the

⁶ This is of course impossible in the case of strict mysteries such as the Trinity and the Incarnation.

⁷ St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, XIV. 10.

⁸ *The Idea of a University*, Discourse II (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1927), p. 38.

⁹ R. M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 43.

higher learning is "thinking about fundamental problems,"¹⁰ the theology of revelation can be banished from the lecture halls only at the expense of abolishing the university itself. No matter how we may wrestle with the problem we are brought unescapably to the dilemma: either theology, with its vast organism of doctrine is false, and then our universities are blameless in their endeavor to muddle along without it; or it is true, and in that case the universities which have discarded it are badly conceived, defectively organized, and grossly incomplete. That revelation is a fact, is demonstrable; that what theology teaches about God, man, the world, and the supernatural order is actually true, is infallibly certain. Without theology, university teaching is one-sided, defective, distorted; for it presents a false, or at best an inadequate, concept of the universe, of the beginning and end of all things, of man and his destiny, of God. Real learning is learning cognizant of *fact*; but the greatest facts of all are the facts presented by theology. To ignore these truths, which alone explain the world and the world's function, is to ignore reality and live in a world of make-believe.

Not only is theology in itself the highest and most important of sciences, but it is the indispensable condition for the unification of all knowledge. In its light alone can the certitudes of reason be illuminated, confirmed, complemented, organized. To co-ordinate the data of revelation, to determine their relations with natural knowledge, to achieve the synthesis of all truth and orient all the aspects of reality toward the ultimate simplicity, is a task that can be successfully undertaken by theology alone.

The natural bent of the human intellect carries it toward the unification of all knowledge. Analysis and abstraction are requisite for method; but synthesis, integration, and the reconstitution of all that is real and concrete, is the goal that beckons to all searchers after truth. This is the case with the physical sciences; and philosophy is in accord with them in the quest of being in its plenitude and intelligibility, and its relation to pure being.

This tendency toward unity cannot succeed unless each science first unifies itself, and then recognizes its relations of subordination and co-ordination with the other sciences. The summit of the knowable, from which alone the multiplicity of sciences can be perceived in perspective and hence synthesized, is unattainable unless the human reason at the zenith of its strivings, which is metaphysics, meets the divine Intelligence descending to the intellects which seek union with it. The unity of the syntheses constructed by the physical sciences must remain largely artificial and necessarily fragmentary. Philosophy likewise is incapable of realizing an integral synthesis; once the prob-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

lems are presented to the philosopher by the total experience of life, he perceives that he can succeed neither in comprehending the whole problem nor in discovering the solution. Theology alone, of all sciences, elevates the human intellect to the contemplation of the one supreme reality and to an intellectual quasi-conformation to it. The human reason may not halt in its quest for unity until it comes to Christ, until it has found the God of revelation.

For even though philosophy demonstrates God and is convinced of His reality, even though it removes from Him all imperfection, it cannot penetrate into His intimate life nor ascertain His plans. Only faith is admitted into this sanctuary; and theology, born of this faith, is the sole science which can contemplate God's intimate life, and can thereupon enter into communication with natural sciences so as to teach them the Intelligence whence they proceed, and the end to which they are ordained.

The truths which theology brings back from this contemplation are of incalculable importance to men. From revelation man learns that human nature, not as it is conceivable in a hypothetical world that never existed, but as it is actually in the historical world of fact, cannot be confined to the natural order but is elevated to the divine plane by the infusion of a seed of divine life, of a super-nature, of sanctifying grace. The theology of revelation alone explains how and why the Triune God wished to draw beings from non-being, how and why He guides finite beings to a participation in His own nature, His own Life. Theology is therefore the most eminent of practical, as well as of speculative, sciences.¹¹

Such is the function of theology in the general synthesis of the sciences. It does not at all supersede their object, nor their effort, nor their method. But it assigns to them all an ordered value toward the Infinite, a real relation to absolute Being.

Thus theology crowns all human sciences. It unifies them because it is the reflection, tempered to the weak eyes of earth-dwellers, of the infinite knowledge of Him who is at once subsistent Intelligence and pure Being.

In view of such considerations, at least vaguely perceived if not explicitly formulated, the dissatisfaction experienced by Catholic educators with President Hutchin's proposal of a few years back is very understandable.¹² Cognizant of the world's tragic rejection of revelation and theology, he advocated a return to Greek thought and the introduction of Aristotelian metaphysics as the unifying agent of university studies. He outlined a program that was admirable for a secularized institution in an infidel society. Objectively, however, what appalling folly it is to eliminate revelation and go back to ancient

¹¹ St. Thomas, *S.T.*; I. 1. 5.

¹² R. M. Hutchins, *Op. Cit.*, Chap. IV.

Greece, as if Christ never existed. We might accomplish all that President Hutchins pleads for, and still we should fail to achieve his objective: the pursuit of ultimate truth. We should still be in the region of fractional truth—of the time before Christ, which was a period of blight, and of preparation; preparation still for what became actual two thousand years ago.

The defect of President Hutchin's program is not that it is daring, but that it is not daring enough. It cannot bring order out of chaos, nor light out of darkness, for it ignores the Light. It is not a *realistic* program, for it is not based on reality, but is only a hesitant compromise. It is not progressive, but reactionary.

Undoubtedly the very thought of revolutionizing secularized education by the introduction of theology is grotesque at the present time, and the same situation may obtain for the next five hundred or ten thousand years. In the meantime institutions where such learning is provided will continue to be vocational schools where a trade or profession may be mastered, but they cannot become, even if fortified by metaphysics, true universities where the quest for ultimate truth may be fostered. For metaphysics, while the highest of natural sciences, is not the highest of sciences; metaphysics cannot touch the supernatural, and man raised to the supernatural order is the only real man, and supernatural participation in the life of God is his only real destiny and the final cause of his being.

Hence, if we are to be logical, we must conclude that real university education can be provided only by Catholic universities. This is not to say that Catholic universities, or at any rate many of them, actually do afford genuine university education. Some of them are not in a position to offer courses on the university level even in the fields of literature, physical sciences, social sciences, and philosophy. Not one of them makes adequate provision for theology in its curricula. Even the very few, such as St. Louis University and Catholic University, which possess Faculties of Theology, admit only candidates for the priesthood to their theological courses.

But the sacred sciences are not merely professional studies for the education of the clergy; they are the living source of the teaching by which we all live. Most Catholics have only a faint glimmer of the divine idea underlying the world and their lives. Theology alone, among university disciplines, can intensify and expand that glimmer into a sun that will illumine their earthly course. If there is a Catholic education, it is because there is a Catholic truth; and like all truth, Catholic truth is the object of limitless study, penetration, and extension. But Catholic truth, as embodied in theology, is not available for university study. With what labors, and sacrifices, and life-consuming anxiety have not the hierarchy and religious orders and Catholic benefactors constructed Catholic colleges and universities!

Finally we have them; but theology, the queen of sciences, the science of Catholic truth, has little or no place in them.

Not only for the general view of the world, the Christian view, which theology engenders, not only because theology is the highest of sciences and the crown of all learning, should it be an integral part of the curriculum of Catholic universities; there is another vital consideration. For more than a hundred years Catholic colleges and universities in this country have been graduating Catholic students. In many communities they are prominent in the various professions. But what influence have they had upon the thought of America? What mark have they made upon our society? Many unfavorable judgments have been pronounced by critics, Catholic and non-Catholic. Severe—but who can say unjust?—are the words of an eminent and observant Catholic gentleman:

Our higher Catholic education has so far failed because it has not been fully Catholic. It has not been fully Catholic because it has not concentrated upon the main thing, which is to supply to the students who seek instruction in the fulness that makes up the general body of culture the one thing that binds up all this cultural knowledge in the final synthesis, the all-embracing Science of human life; the thing that brings all together and directs all to the one ultimate end. That thing is theology. What on earth can the purpose of higher education in a Catholic college be if it is not to steep the student in the Church's mind and what is the Church's mind on all things but theology? We have not produced an articulate body exponent of the Catholic mind because we have not made theology an integral part of Catholic higher educational curricula.¹⁸

Catholic graduates have failed to make their voices heard because, lacking the Catholic education which only theology can impart, they have generally had so little to say.

It is true that the final objective of Christianity is not scholarship but eternal life; not theology but sanctity. It is likewise true that to save the world Christ did not choose twelve professors of theology but unlettered fishermen. To see the truth is certainly not the same as to establish it in our lives; but it is a great deal, for having perceived it we at least know how to live. Every advance in speculative knowledge has repercussions in practical life; a Catholic social order presupposes a Catholic intellectual order. Before we can act, we must know the *end* of our activity. All endeavor, for instance, in the field of sociology is ultimately futile unless we understand the supernatural elevation and destiny of man, and unless we are cognizant of the obstacle to doing good that arises from the concupiscence by original sin, and are aware that that obstacle can be surmounted only by the grace of Christ.

¹⁸ Thomas F. Woodlock, "The Thread of Arachne," *Columbia*, March, 1943, p. 18.

No one, perhaps, would contend that Catholic universities actually do teach theology in the religion courses required of Catholic students. A glance at the courses offered is sufficient to dissipate such a notion. Good they are, no doubt; but they are not theology. The science of theology is a difficult science, a science that demands years of painstaking and focused effort; effort at least equal to the study and application requisite for the mastery of any other branch of knowledge. The four year course designed for candidates to the priesthood at St. Mary's College, the School of Divinity of St. Louis University, prescribes ten class periods a week for three years for dogmatic (or "systematic") theology alone, exclusive of proportionately lengthy courses in fundamental theology, moral theology, Sacred Scripture, Canon Law, ecclesiastical history, and a number of other disciplines, electives, and seminars of an auxiliary character. No such program could possibly be envisaged for theology as advocated for the Catholic university lay undergraduate; but it shows that the few courses in religion as now offered do not constitute even an introduction to theology.

But a systematic, carefully integrated course in theology, which would receive at least the attention now given to scholastic philosophy in Catholic colleges and universities, with professors as well prepared and judiciously chosen, is not an unreasonable proposal. Properly to arrange such a curriculum would require much thought, and to inaugurate it might demand a minor degree of heroism. But if our education is to become truly Catholic, and if the dissatisfaction felt by Catholic educators and critics is to lead to a more wholesome educational program, the best talent of the religious orders and other groups conducting Catholic institutions of higher learning should be assigned to the task. To ameliorate the fundamental situation, nothing less than radical measures will suffice.

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PROVIDENCE AND EXEMPLARITY IN A PHILOSOPHY OF BEING

WHEN SAINT Thomas in the thirteenth century unobtrusively insisted that the act of being is "to be," and hence philosophy, which is the science of being, should build itself upon the act of existence, he was effecting in the history of Christian Wisdom a veritable revolution. For the Thomistic metaphysic of God as the Author of being thus placed natural wisdom in its truest, because most real, Christian context. The consequences of such a revolution were innumerable; one of these, intimately connected with this notion of being, and illustrative at the same time of the revolution created by such a notion, was the metaphysical location of Christian Providence. Thus a study of providence, in its Christian and pre-Christian context, will afford a greater insight into that simple statement of St. Thomas, that the act of being is "to be."

The first thing to be noted in approaching the problem of providence is the essential relation that it bears to a philosopher's theory of "Ideas."¹ This is not to say, however, that before the introduction into philosophy of a theory of ideas philosophers did not accept a divine providence. Just as many of the early Greek philosophers took their world for granted, so also did they take their gods. The first philosophers were interested in things rather than persons; and when the psychologists did arrive, it was about themselves and not about a Supreme Being that they first philosophized. Pure speculation about the existence and nature of God came late in the history of philosophy. For such speculation presupposed a theory of knowledge and reflection upon certain metaphysical principles of being.² Aristotle, the first great rationalist in matters of religion, has traced for us the origin of the Greek gods. They arose from an observation by man of self-movement and the conscious knowledge of his own soul. Hence these gods came to be thought of as living beings endowed with intelligence and free will; for these are the properties of man's own soul. As a result of an extreme anthropomorphism which gave to them their life and personality, the first Greek gods were capable of knowing and loving mortal men.

PLATO: IDEAS, AND THE PROVIDENCE OF THE GODS

These remarks assume significance when we come to study Plato's

¹ St. Thomas, *De Ver.*, 5. 1 ad 1. In everyday speech, the word "idea" has a variety of meanings. As a technical term in Thomistic philosophy it means an exemplary cause existing in the mind of an artist, be he human or divine, according to which some external effect is to be produced. It is in this sense that the word will be used in this paper.

² St. Thomas, *Sum. c. Gent.*, I. 4.

theory of ideas and try to link it with his religious thought. For, religiously, Plato was the product of his age. He accepted, with certain reservations, the mythological tradition of Greek religion and its anthropomorphic gods. As a philosopher he was the first to formulate a theory of the exemplary cause. The important point here is to understand why he did so. For it was not to justify philosophically God's knowledge of creatures that Plato posited the necessity of the ideas. Plato's problem as a philosopher was not to safeguard the Intelligence of God but the intelligibility of being. His reason for positing the subsistence of Ideas was in answer to an ontological demand, a demand that arose from the notion that Plato had of being.³ To the genius of Plato the Many of Heraclitus was as equally devoid of intelligibility as the One of Parmenides. For absolute diversity or absolute unity would both leave the intellect of man unaffected.⁴ An intellectual cognition of a thing includes a communal aspect which the object shares with other beings and a differential aspect that distinguishes it from them. But since being is intelligible, neither the One nor the Many, if taken absolutely, are beings. Rather it is by means of them, by a participation in sameness and diversity that being becomes intelligible and thus becomes itself. Plato's subsistent Ideas are so many common natures,⁵ for example, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, in which diversity (non-being) can share. The

³ This gives rise to the question of whether, in Plato's mind, the Idea had primarily an epistemological or ontological value; that is, did Plato posit the Idea primarily to insure the reality of being or the intelligibility of reality? Since Plato seems to have made a perfect correspondence between thought and being, it is difficult to determine which of these two "demands" came first in his own mind; yet perhaps because of this very correspondence our question has only a pseudo-value. It might be added that the brief and simplified interpretation here given of the Idea in Plato, namely, that it is an intelligible cause, real being, hence really existing in some de-spatialized and de-temporalized "world," is the traditional and more common interpretation. Among the ancients it was the interpretation of Aristotle, and among the Medievals that of St. Thomas; and in our own day it has the authority of such Plato scholars as A. E. Taylor, E. Gilson, F. A. Cornford, J. Stenzel, and Hans von Arnim. In fact it is hard to see how on this point the thought of Plato is logically susceptible of any other interpretation. But, see W. Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), pp. 520-525.

⁴ For a discussion of this point, see the interesting essay of Anton Pegis, "The Dilemma of Unity and Being," in *Essays in Thomism*, ed. R. Brennan, O.P. (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942), pp. 151-183. As Pegis points out, the dilemma of unity and being is an irreducible one, since for being to be it must be intelligible, and to be intelligible it must be many, that is, it must share in diversity, in otherness—in non-being. If being were one it would be completely unintelligible, for in order to know beings we must recognize their differences: *Cognoscere est distingueare*. That is why the One of Plato and Plotinus is above being, unintelligible and formless. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-158.

⁵ For the development of these "common natures" of Plato is scholastic epistemology, and the final resolution they received at the hand of Occam and the Nominalists, see A. Pegis, *Ibid.*, pp. 159-174.

union, then, of being and non-being, of unity and diversity makes a thing at once to be and to be intelligible. According to Plato the immortal gods participated in the cognition of these common perfections in a more eminent degree than did mortal man. Because of their intelligence they were aware of the affairs of men, and their participation in Goodness made them interest themselves in these affairs. What Plato was really doing was rationalizing, to a certain extent, Greek anthropomorphism. Because of their participation in the Ideas the Platonic gods could exercise a certain providence over men.

This, then, is the connection between the providence of the Platonic gods and Plato's theory of Ideas. Participating in the unchangeable perfections of Intelligence and Goodness, the gods could know and love mortal men. But because of the primacy of the Ideas, that which was of chief interest to the Platonic gods was not so much men as Man.⁶ There is an important distinction between the Idea as formulated by Plato and as later adopted by Christian thinkers. In Plato, the Idea did not exist for the *primary* purpose that other forms should imitate or participate in It. For the Ideas were, of all things, the most real; they existed *par excellence* and in their own right.⁷ Nor did their existence depend upon the thought or volition of any Supreme God of Plato. Many writers, it is true, have identified the highest of these Ideas, the Good, with God, and have called It the God of Plato. Such an identification, however is still awaiting its historical justification. Perhaps Plato could have made the connection and even should have. But unless we want to run the risk of reading into Plato things he never wrote, we should not say that he did so.⁸

⁶ Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. by A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 190-191.

⁷ In this sense, St. Thomas would not allow to the Idea the true *ratio* of an exemplary cause. "Deinde . . . excludit contrarium errorem ponentium exemplaria rerum esse quaedam supraentia separata. . . . Exemplar enim est secundum quod fit aliud, ut sic exemplar imitetur. Res autem non sunt factae ad hoc ut imitentur aliqua superiora entia, sed ad hoc quod in eis impleatur quod divina sapientia ordinavit. Unde non sunt proprie rerum exemplaria quaecumque rerum principalia . . ." *Expositio super Dionysium, De Divinis Nominibus*, 5, 3, *Opuscula Omnia S. Thomae Aquinatis* (7th ed.; Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1927), vol. II, p. 504.

⁸ As Gilson has pointed out in his work, *God and Philosophy*, Plato himself never called the Idea of the Good God; as a matter of fact, he never called any of the Ideas gods. For though both the Ideas and the gods were for Plato immortal, unchangeable, and necessary, the Ideas were Things, Intelligible Causes, while the gods were persons, intelligent beings. E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 26. The closest Plato comes to calling the Idea of the Good God is when he says that the sun, who is a god, is the child of the Good. Why in Plato's mind the sun can be a god without its intelligible cause, the Good, being a god, is obvious from what has been remarked concerning the origin of the Greek gods. The sun-god is necessary, immortal, and unchangeable because of its participation in the Ideas. And this is why a being who is below the Ideas can be a god while the Ideas are not gods. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

The subsistence of Plato's Ideas are, therefore, autonomous, and outside the Mind of any Supreme God. In a Christian Philosophy, however, we shall see that the ideas are in God, that they are simply the Essence of God known as imitable, and that they have no reason for existence except in so far as they are related to an actual or possible imitation.

Furthermore, Plato did not have a God that could create. His Demi-urge merely presided at the fashioning of those sublunary forms which were made according to the image and likeness of the independent and subsistent Ideas. The fashioners themselves were the demi-gods. To these latter, then, did Plato largely ascribe the task of governing the affairs of men; and this they could do for the simple reason that being, as we have seen, good themselves, they could not but wish well to mankind. These gods ruled man according to a law which gave good things to the good and evil things to the evil. And this law, which Plato transferred to the moral field, was that ancient law which permeated so much of early Greek cosmology and psychology, the law that like loves like.⁹

In the Universe of Plato there was also present a large measure of "necessity." And this necessarily so, for in his philosophy matter is uncreated; it is an absolute, entirely independent of any control of the gods. For Plato, matter could suffer neither generation nor corruption, and it permeated, as a positive principle of evil and ignorance, the entire gamut of sensible being. There was no providence over this vast darkness that proceeded from the principle of matter. And here an important remark should be made. If Plato's doctrine of divine providence seems closer to the Christian conception than does that of Aristotle, the reason is not a strictly metaphysical one. It is due rather to the non-philosophical tradition of Greek religion which Plato accepted. Again, Plato often added myths and poetry to support the higher reaches of his metaphysics; and it is a tribute to his vision to remark that he was sometimes more correct in the addition he made than in certain aspects of his fundamental metaphysics. We shall see that when Plato's thought is placed in a consistent metaphysical framework, as it was later by Plotinus, the philosophical conception of divine providence becomes scarcely more heartening than that of Aristotle.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. *Laws*, Bk. IV. 713D; Bk. X; Cf. E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 148.

¹⁰ Plotinus did not take all the metaphysical principles of Plato in his effort to construct a consistent metaphysic; rather, he developed one of the lines of thought latent in the principles of Plato. It would have been quite impossible for Plotinus to have taken all of Plato's principles and erected one consistent metaphysic; for some of these principles would have led him to contradictory conclusions.

ARISTOTLE: DIVINE KNOWLEDGE NO SOURCE OF PROVIDENCE

For those philosophers who had not come to a formulation of a theory of ideas the notion of providence had no philosophical basis for its existence. To the list of these philosophers for whom, metaphysically speaking, there could be no divine providence, one must add the name of Aristotle.¹¹

The God of Aristotle was a Self-Thinking Thought, an infinite Nature with perfect knowledge of Its own Essence. That the God of Aristotle could know itself perfectly is not hard to see: Thought is Its very Nature. That It should also know whatever mortals know, is equally easy to see, for Its Essence contains the totality of Thought. In fact, Its Essence could even contain the totality of all natures as thought, and thus It could know all natures. But what the God of Aristotle could never know was the all-important fact that such natures *existed*. Hence, to say that Aristotle's God knows all that mortals know, is not the same as saying that It knows that there are mortals.¹² Confined to the knowledge of Its own Thought, the God of Aristotle could never know the Universe since Its knowledge did not extend to the existence of the Universe. When Aristotle made this First Principle, the Self-Thinking Thought, his supreme God, he was destroying at one stroke Greek mythology and Greek religion. For a Self-Thinking Thought can think only about Itself, and men are relieved from any duty of respect or adoration. This is logically atheism, the ultimate answer of pre-Christian rationalists in matters of religion.

If the God of Aristotle, the Act of Pure Thought thinking Itself, was a scandal to Christian thinkers, It yet remains as one of the most imposing monuments to his metaphysical genius. For this God was not born of any Platonic myth or poetry of thought; rather It sprang from Aristotle's own metaphysical principles of being, and was consistent with that vision which he had of being. Yet having no knowledge of the existence of men, Aristotle's God could exercise no divine providence over them. For to know their existence, this God would have had either to create them or be united with them in some cognitive union. The latter was impossible, for union to Aristotle implied a composition; and composition in God would be an imperfection which would really result in His denial. The other way of knowledge,

¹¹ The absence in Aristotle of an exemplary cause for other things than human products of art was a scandal to the Medieval Augustinians. St. Bonaventura has referred to this defect as "the error of Aristotle." Cf. *In Hexaemeron*, col. vi, n. 2. See also, John F. McCormick, "The Error of Aristotle," *The Modern Schoolman*, XIX (1942), 51-53.

¹² On this question, cf. the fine remarks made by Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 153, and especially the note on page 457.

by creative¹³ causality, was equally closed to Aristotle's God. For even if this God did possess the exemplary causes, the Ideas, yet in order to create He had first to be raised to the Creator-level of Pure Being. But in Aristotle's metaphysics God was only Pure Thought. Nevertheless, precisely in this lies the genius of Aristotle, for he made his God the only thing which, in his essential notion of being, he could have made It; a Thought wrapped up with Itself.

PLOTINUS: IN THE ONE, NEITHER IDEAS NOR PROVIDENCE

It is in the Philosophy of Plotinus that certain of the fundamental principles in the metaphysics of Plato are given a logical completion. And here it is, too, that the essential character of Plato's Philosophy bears its proper fruits in a natural theology. The One of the *Parmenides* and the Good of the *Republic* are identified by Plotinus with God.¹⁴ God, then, has been given a philosophical status, but it is the status of a nature; He becomes the One and the Good, and He is eternally resigned to act according to the essence of His nature. Being One, the God of Plotinus is above the intelligibility of being, possessing a nature of utter simplicity and formlessness. Such a God neither knows nor creates beings. He cannot know them because, above being, he has not the forms of their intelligibility. He is confined to the knowledge of his own nature.¹⁵ Since He is above being He cannot create; that is, He cannot give existence to others for He is not the Act of existence. In such a philosophy, God can exercise no providence over men He does not know nor over the Universe He has not created. Here necessity becomes the law of all being. Liberty is denied even to God; for it is only through intelligence that one is able to direct his actions toward an end; when intelligence is absent, those actions are determined by the nature or the essence of

¹³ It is uncertain whether or not St. Thomas attributed to Aristotle a doctrine of creation. Cf. *De Articulis Fidei, Opuscula Omnia S. Thomae Aquinatis* (7th ed.; Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1927), vol. III, p. 3. Also, *De Pot.*, 3. 5. In his work, *De Substantiis Separatis*, St. Thomas does say that Aristotle and Plato could have reached a doctrine of creation since they possessed the concept of a spiritual being. Even with the true concept of a spiritual being in their possession the Platonists had the further problem of ascertaining how such a being could have originated. For an analysis of this Thomistic text, cf. A. Pegis, *art. cit.*, pp. 180-183. See also, by the same author, *St. Thomas and the Greeks*, (Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1939), pp. 101-104.

¹⁴ *Enneads*, VI. 8. Plotinus does not always limit the word "God" to this first unbegotten principle.

¹⁵ It is difficult to see the possibility of even self-contemplation for the One; being above being, he would seem to be above the intelligibility even of himself. It is Plotinus himself who asks the question: "As to the unbegotten principle, who has nothing above him . . . what reason might he have to think?" *Enneads*, VI. 7, 37. Quoted from E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, p. 50. The first emanation is due neither to an act of intelligence nor volition, but is a necessary communication of perfection on the part of the One. *Bonum est diffusivum sui* is a principle that is applied in Plotinus in its efficient rather than in its final sense. The point to be noted, however, is that the communication of perfection is a necessary one.

which a thing is. And to be determined by nature is to be necessitated to do what we do.¹⁶ In the Plotinian God there is neither providence nor creation, liberty nor intelligence, as these things are understood in a Christian Philosophy.

AUGUSTINE: THE PROBLEM OF TRANSFERRING THE IDEAS TO GOD

Thus, when we come to consider the notion of Divine Providence in a Christian Philosophy, we find an attitude of thought entirely different from the one we have been studying. The reason for the difference is one of extreme metaphysical importance. At first sight it might seem that Christian Philosophy solved all the difficulties concerning creation and providence by simply transferring the Ideas of Plato to the Mind of the *Christian* God. In point of fact, Augustine,¹⁷ who is credited with making this change, executed a transition that was full of philosophical peril. It was a change that a Platonist, who in his philosophy identified God with the One of Plato's *Parmenides*, would never have made. To place Ideas in the One would mean to destroy Its Essence; for Its Essence is to be One. Distinct forms, then, would compromise the utter simplicity of Its Oneness. Plotinus, as we have seen, placed the One above being; for since being is intelligible, it is somehow many. How St. Augustine could make such a transfer of Platonic essences and not compromise the unity of his Christian God he does not say. To St. Augustine it was not a problem of philosophy but of faith that he had to resolve. Making no conscious distinction between his philosophy and theology, he often expressed his theology in terms of the only philosophy that he knew—neo-Platonism. For this reason Augustine could read into the philosophical postulate of the One, Intellect, and Soul of Plotinus the strict mystery of the Christian Trinity.¹⁸ If St. Augustine never philosophically justified his transfer of Plato's Ideas into the Mind of Augustine's God, the reason is that it never occurred to him the transfer needed philosophical justification. To see this "transfer" justified, and to see, therefore, the true metaphysical status of Divine Providence, we must study the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. For it is here that the Christian God is given His full philosophical stature of the Pure Act of Being.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the notion of liberty that is possible in the God of Plotinus, cf. Cassian Patrick Gorman, "Freedom in the God of Plotinus," *The New Scholasticism*, XIV (1940), 379-405.

¹⁷ "Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. . . . Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est." *Liber de Diversis Quaestionibus*, LXXXIII. qu. 46 (P.L., vol. XL, col. 30).

¹⁸ *Confessionum*, VII, 9 (P.L., vol. XXXII, col. 740-741).

EVOLUTION OF THE IDEAS IN CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALISM

The God of St. Thomas is not limited to any nature or essence. He is Perfect Being, the Pure Act of "To Be." Aided by Revelation and his own metaphysical genius, St. Thomas elevated the principles of an essential Greek Philosophy to the level of an existential Christian Philosophy. And with these principles he established a natural theology that made his God the Pure Act of Existence. From now on, the reality of things would be sought in terms of their existence rather than of their essence; "to be" means now to exist, whereas for a Greek it meant "to-be-wise" or "to-be-good."¹⁹

At this point we might ask an important question. Why was it that the pagan philosopher never arrived at this Christian notion of being? Why did their metaphysics remain to the end essential and their logic conceptual? The question is an important one for philosophy, and its answer is an historical argument for the peculiar nature of human cognition. Man, being a composite of spirit and matter, has a mode of cognition that is abstractive. The proper objects of his intellect are the abstracted essences of the material things that are around him. Existence, however, cannot be abstracted; for it is not an essence, but rather the act by which an essence is. Yet, because of the nature of our thought processes, we can treat existence after the manner of an essence; that is, we can conceptualize it and write it as a noun—*existence*. Yet as it is exercised by the existent, it is not represented by a noun but by a verb—"to be." Existence as conceptualized has only a mental value and plays no part in a *metaphysic* of existence. Moreover, even in the judgment, where the act of "to be" is grasped by the mind, that which was chiefly considered by the Greek philosophers was the *determination* given the subject by the predicate rather than the all-important fact that this determination existed.

In order, then, to meet the necessities demanded by a philosophy of being whose God is the Pure Act of Being, the notion of the Idea itself had to be changed. This change is clearly marked in St. Thomas. For Plato, that which was most real was the Idea; and this Idea did not exist *for the sake* of any production of other beings of which It was the archetype. This, however, is not the case with the ideas which Thomas puts in the Divine Mind. The Christian God is unutterably simple; whatever is in God is God. And hence the ideas of God are His very Essence.²⁰ Being Pure Being, God is also Pure Intelligibility; thus the knowledge He has of Himself comprehends the infinite plenitude of His Being. Knowing Himself perfectly, He can know

¹⁹ Cf. Bernard J. Muller-Thym, *On The University of Being in Meister Eckhart of Hochheim* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), p. 2.

²⁰ Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia. S. T., I. 15. 1 ad 3.

Himself as imitable; and this knowledge of His imitability is the origin of His Divine Ideas.²¹ Apart from its relation to an actual creation, the word *idea* has no meaning.²² And creation becomes possible, for a God Who is infinite Being, and yet Who can know His Essence as limited, can give limited being to others. And from this fact of creation there flows whatever is deepest and most far-reaching in a Christian Providence.

IDEAS AND PROVIDENCE IN THE CHRISTIAN GOD

In a Christian Providence that is based upon a creative theory of ideas, we come face to face with a God Who knows all things because he has made them all. And this God knows the beings that He has made as they are in themselves, not in the sense that created being terminates His knowledge, but in the sense, that being the Supreme Act of Existence, He can have a knowledge of the existence of beings in themselves by knowing Himself as the cause of their existence.

Obviously, such a God Who knows things in themselves can know the singular;²³ for whatever is, is singular. To know the corporeal singular is to know the individual, and to know the individual is to know matter, since matter is the principle of individuation. God knows matter in all the ways that it is knowable. He knows it both in relation to its intelligible principle, form,²⁴ and he knows it also, improperly, in itself.²⁵ For even prime matter has been created by God.²⁶

Thus a Providence based on creation extends to each individual in the species. In the case of those beings which lack an intellect, the

²¹ "Deus enim, etsi sit in sua essentia unus, tamen intelligendo suam unitatem et virtutem cognoscit quidquid in eo virtualiter existit. Sic igitur cognoscit ex ipso posse procedere res diversas. Hujusmodi igitur quae cognoscit ex se posse prodire, rationes intellectae dicuntur." *De Div. Nom.*, loc. cit., p. 503. Cf. *De Ver.*, 3. 2c.

²² "Non autem omnes hujusmodi rationes exemplaria dici possunt. Exemplar enim est ad cuius imitationem fit aliud. Non autem omnia, quae scit Deus ex ipso posse prodire, vult in rerum natura producere. Illae igitur solae rationes intellectae a Deo exemplaria dici possunt ad quarum imitationem vult res in esse producere, sicut producit artifex artificata ad imitationem formarum artis quas mente concipit, quae etiam artificialium exemplaria dici possunt." *De Div. Nom.*, loc. cit., pp. 503-504.

²³ For a discussion on God's knowledge of the singular, see A. Forest, *La Structure Metaphysique Du Concret Selon Saint Thomas D'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931), pp. 294-301.

²⁴ "Nos . . . ponimus materiam causatam esse a Deo; unde necesse est ponere quod aliquo modo sit ejus idea in Deo . . . si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni quod materia prima per se habeat ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi; quia idea proprie dicta respicit rem secundum quod est producibilis in esse; materia autem non potest exire in esse sine forma . . ." *De Ver.*, 3. 5c.

²⁵ "Si autem large accipiamus ideam pro similitudine vel ratione, tunc illa possunt per se distinctam habere ideam quae possunt distincte considerari, quamvis separatis esse non possint; et sic nihil prohibet materiae primae etiam secundum se ideam esse." *Ibid.*

²⁶ *S. T.*, I. 44. 2c.

Providence of God reaches down, indeed, to the individual members of the species, but He is provident over these individuals not for themselves but for the sake of the species. This is the teaching of St. Thomas.²⁷

In the case of those individuals, who because of their intellectual soul are endowed with personality and ordained to eternal beatitude, the Providence of the Supreme Being is especially vigilant. Here Divine Providence extends to the knowledge of that very order by which these beings are referred to their last end.²⁸ This Providence likewise extends to the knowledge of the individual acts of each person, especially of his intellectual and moral acts. In such a perspective of Providence, it is obvious that there is no room for "fate" or "chance."²⁹ We use such terms because *we* can assign no reason for the meeting of two causal events, for we cannot see the machinery of Divine Providence as it is operated in all its perfection and detail by the Divine Wisdom.

GREEK ESSENTIALISM AND CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALISM

These brief considerations have taken us far from the views of providence as set forth in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. When one remembers the difficulty with which Christian Philosophy finally freed itself from the bonds of Greek essentialism, it is disconcerting to see these philosophies identified. Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy has recently written: "Europeans . . . should rediscover Christianity, or what amounts to the same thing, Plato."³⁰ Now no one questions Dr. Coomaraswamy's knowledge of Plato, but has he grasped what is most central in a *Christian Philosophy*? His Platonic impatience of the Christian's interest in historical contingencies and temporal events would lead one to believe he has not.³¹ The historical fact of Christ's temporal existence, the contingencies of the words he spoke and the death He died are as *real* and as important to the Christian as is any Platonic form. For the Christian is very interested in existence. Logically, a Christian Platonist is a philosophical contradiction. For the only philosophy which a Christian can have is a Christian Philosophy; and a Christian Philosophy is based on a

²⁷ *S. T.*, I. 22. 2 ad 5.

²⁸ *S. T.*, I. 22. 1c.

²⁹ *S. T.*, I. 22. 2 ad 1; 103. 7 ad 2.

³⁰ Anadanda K. Coomaraswamy, "Eastern Wisdom and Western Knowledge," *Isis*, XXXIV (1943), 359-363.

³¹ "For the Hindu, the events of the Rgveda are nowhere and dateless, and the Krishna Lila 'not an historical event'; and the reliance of Christianity upon supposedly historical 'facts' seems to be its greatest weakness." *Ibid.*, p. 360. As an interesting contrast with these remarks of Dr. Coomaraswamy, the reader is referred to the article of Dr. Bernard J. Muller-Thym, "St. Thomas and the Recapturing of Natural Wisdom," *The Modern Schoolman*, XVIII (1941), 64-68. It will be seen that what is involved here are two different attitudes of thought.

metaphysic of existence and not, as is Platonism, upon one of natures. The work that Dr. Coomaraswamy is doing to rid Modern Philosophy of its non-metaphysical character and to give it a proper intellectual foundation is certainly praiseworthy and very much demanded by modern Philosophy. But he will never be able to fit Christian Philosophy into a Platonic synthesis.

In fact, it is not easy to see how a Christian Philosophy, which is a philosophy of existence, has any strict or *necessary* continuity with Greek essentialism. It seems that Aristotelianism, of itself, would never have developed into Thomism. We are often reminded that St. Thomas had first to be a Christian before he could rethink Aristotle's principles; and that was no easy task even for a Christian. After all, the truest Aristotelians may have been the Averroists; and we have had our Christian Averroists. To maintain the thesis that Thomism is the logical completion of Aristotle, or that Christianity is the vision of Plato realized, is to miss at once what is most profound in Christianity and what is most truly characteristic of Greek Philosophy. We do not fuse natures by destroying their proper essences.

Neither, then, is the notion of a Christian Providence an elaboration of the Greek concept. Christian Providence, as we have seen, presupposes a doctrine of creation which in its turn can flow only from an existential metaphysic. The Greeks had neither the doctrine of creation nor the existential metaphysic; thus they did not possess the foundation upon which a Christian Providence could have been built. Apart from the non-philosophical accretions of Greek thought, there was little room for divine providence. Plato had said that since the gods existed, they were intelligent and good, and thus could know and love men and watch over their affairs. As for the Self-Thinking Thought of Aristotle, it was ignorant of the fact that men existed; and the One of Plotinus could know, if anything, only Itself. But in a Christian Philosophy all men, their existence, their natures, and their acts, lie bared to the all-seeing eye of their Creator. Even matter, which obscures our vision, is known by its Creator. And the true well-springs of such a Providence are the creative ideas of a God Who is Himself existence. For this is God's own revealed name of Himself, *Yahweh*, "He who is," a name which, when properly analysed by Christian thinkers, proved rich in its metaphysical implications for God and creatures. And is not this simply to say that our Christian Faith, while not the cause of our Christian Philosophy, is in truth a necessary condition for its rectitude and for its proper fulfillment?

MAURICE R. HOLLOWAY

PHYSIOCRATIC ECONOMICS AND THE NATURAL LAW

MORE THAN a decade ago Norman J. Ware observed that, "There is no body of economic theory more misunderstood than that of the Physiocrats."¹ While it is certain that no group of writers have been more variously interpreted, most authorities seem agreed today that they composed the first school of systematic economic thought.² It is as such a group that they have been interpreted by almost all students of economic theory since Adam Smith. Such an interpretation resulted from a combination of happenings that threw their theories into temporary oblivion and then brought them to light in an entirely different setting from that in which they had been written.

The Physiocrats were a group of eighteenth-century moral philosophers who addressed themselves to the problem of reforming pre-Revolutionary France. Centering around François Quesnay, Madame de Pompadour's physician, there came into being about 1756 a closely knit group of reformers who agreed with their master on all cardinal points of doctrine.³ The school enjoyed fleeting prestige in the learned circles of France, had its own journal, *Éphémérides du citoyen*, strongly influenced the government of Louis XV and of Louis XVI, and attracted the attention of such "enlightened despots" as Catherine II of Russia, Gustavus III of Sweden and Emperor Leopold II.

The Physiocrats, however, quickly fell into disrepute and thence into temporary oblivion. Turgot's failure to improve conditions in France during his brief ministry (1774-1776) discredited physiocratic theory, which he had sought to apply in his sweeping reforms. The triumph of the political ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau in the French Revolution, against both of whom the Physiocrats had pressed

¹ "The Physiocrats: A Study in Economic Rationalization," *The American Economic Review*, XII (1931), 607.

² See, for example, Auguste Oncken, *Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay* (Paris: 1888), p. xi; Henry Higgs, *The Physiocrats* (London: 1897), p. 3; Georges Weulersse, *Le mouvement physiocratique en France* (Paris: 1910), II, 707. This is the practically unanimous opinion of the historians of economic thought, who rely chiefly on Oncken and Weulersse for their judgments on the Physiocrats.

³ Quesnay's associates recognized him as their master at all times. The most voluminous of his disciples was the elder Mirabeau, who left forty published volumes in addition to contributions to various journals totaling many volumes and a staggering correspondence running into thousands of letters. Abbé Nicholas Baudouin and Pierre Samuel DuPont were less wordy but more capable popularizers of Quesnay's theories. In addition to Quesnay himself, the only contributor to the finished body of physiocracy was Mercier de la Rivière, whose *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, written under Quesnay's immediate direction, was accepted by all as the definitive summing up of physiocratic philosophy.

home unrelenting attacks, further discredited the followers of Quesnay, all of whom had argued for a benevolent despotism.⁴

Even more disastrous to the Physiocrats' cause had been the appearance in 1776 of Adam Smith's influential *Wealth of Nations*, which damned physiocratic doctrine with faint praise. As the triumph of Montesquieu's and Rousseau's theories discredited the Physiocrats' political ideas, so the triumph of Smith's and his followers' economic theories discredited their economic theories. Smith, moreover, gave to the English-speaking world a false picture of physiocracy, for he treated it merely as "an agricultural system" which he failed to place in its proper setting as only one part of the physiocratic system. Unfortunately for the Physiocrats, the *Wealth of Nations* survived the French Revolution and soon became almost the sole source of information in English on the Physiocrats.

More to blame even than Smith for the misunderstanding of the Physiocrats is Eugène Daire, who rescued them from oblivion with his collection of some of their writings in 1846. Daire claimed in the preface of his work that he had collected all the important and basic works of the Physiocrats, that their other writings dealt with special and relatively unimportant questions. But Daire had omitted all their works except those which dealt with purely economic questions, leaving out, for example, the first twenty-six chapters of Mercier de la Rivière's *L'Ordre naturel* as being "un assemblage très confus de dissertations tenant tout à la fois à l'ordre moral, à la politique et aux intérêts matériels de la société."⁵

NINETEENTH CENTURY DISTORTIONS OF PHYSIOCRACY

Thus the Physiocrats came to be studied as economists—in the modern, positivistic sense of the term. Their economic theories were taken from their body of thought, divorced from moral philosophy and colored by the nineteenth-century bias of the classical economists. This new concept of economics, as a matter of fact, had made its appearance while some of the younger Physiocrats were still alive. DuPont, for example, wrote to Jean-Baptiste Say, condemning his concept of economics in these terms:

You have narrowed the course of economics too much in treating it only as the science of wealth. It is instead the science of natural law applied, as it should be, to civilized society. It is the science of constitutions, which includes, and should include, not only what a government must not do in its own interest and for the wealth of the nation, but also what it cannot do before God. . . .⁶

⁴ This is not to deny that the Physiocrats had their influence on the social changes effected in the French Revolution. But their influence was not direct even here, for theirs was only one voice in a swelling chorus of criticism of the abuses of the Old Regime.

⁵ Eugène Daire, *Physiocrates* (Paris: 1846), p. 436.

But the views of Smith and Say prevailed so that when the Physiocrats were brought to light in 1846 their theories were treated to fit the new concept of economics as a separate and independent science. Their constant references to natural law, however, could not be ignored. Natural law to the Physiocrats, nineteenth-century commentators explained, was a Newtonian concept of physical tendencies to be observed in society, similar to the Ricardian iron law of wages. Such an explanation proved to be so unsatisfactory to later inquirers that many new attempts were made to explain away just what the Physiocrats understood by natural law.⁷ As late as 1936, however, Harold Lasky could complain that no satisfactory explanation had yet been offered.⁸

This failure to understand what the Physiocrats meant by natural law can be explained only by the rise of positivism and the widening gulf between modern thought and the traditional thought inherited from medieval times, a gulf which was in the making in the eighteenth century. For the refusal to recognize any laws save that of "tendencies" discoverable by the observation of economic phenomena makes the physiocratic concept of natural law unintelligible to the modern critic. Pierre Struvé, to cite only one example, observes that the basis of Quesnay's theories is "the old stoic notion that the moral law and natural law are one," whereupon he concludes, "The fundamental contradiction of this conception is evident. It is the primitive confusion of the idea of the natural law and the idea of moral law."⁹ The positivistic critics, moreover, apparently do not realize that economics was a branch of moral philosophy in medieval times and for long after, nor do they seem aware that it was not a completely neglected study before the Physiocrats. Struvé, for example, claims that Quesnay was the first to apply natural law to economics, while Wilhelm Hasbach maintains that, "The ethical doctrines of the Church of the Middle Ages were the enemy of man, the enemy of the world."¹⁰

Jerome Mille, who discovers in physiocratic thought "a basis profoundly positivistic and modern," comes to the conclusion: "The

⁶ This letter was written by DuPont from aboard the "Fingal" on April 22, 1815, when he finished reading the second edition of Say's book. The letter was printed in the seventeenth edition of the *Cours complet d'économie politique*, edited in 1844 by Jean-Baptiste Say's son, Horace.

⁷ See, for example: Wilhelm Hasbach, *Die allgemeinen philosophischen Grundlagen der von François Quesnay und Adam Smith begründeten politischen Ökonomie* (Leipzig: 1891); Thorstein Veblen, "The Preconceptions of Economic Science," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XIII (1899); O. H. Taylor, "Economics and the Idea of Natural Law" and "Economics and the Idea of *Jus Naturale*," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLIV (1929 and 1930).

⁸ *The Rise of Liberalism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), p. 319.

⁹ "L'Idée de loi naturelle dans la science économique," *Revue de l'économie politique*, XXXV (1921), 298-299.

¹⁰ "Les fondements philosophiques de l'économie politique de Quesnay et de Smith," *Revue de l'économie politique*, VII (1893), 777.

thought which guided them differed very much from that of the philosophers of the Middle Ages who deprecated the material world so as to put emphasis only on their scholastic abstractions."¹¹ Eugène Daire was of the opinion that in medieval times such concepts as those of justice and natural rights were obscure, that Quesnay was the first to have any concept of distributive justice, and that both religion and morality were lost in the clouds of a future life.¹² Such minds as this could not hope to understand what DuPont meant when he told his readers that the "edifice of economics" could be erected only "on the solid basis of natural law."¹³

ECONOMICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Properly to understand the place that economics occupied in the physiocratic system, one must realize that the Physiocrats were primarily moral philosophers and only secondarily economists. Quesnay, founder and master of the school, wrote on philosophical subjects before he turned his attention to the pressing economic problems of France in the middle of the eighteenth century. The 1747 edition of his *Essai physique sur l'économie animale* contains articles on such subjects as the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul; his article "Evidence," written for the *Encyclopédie* in 1756 shortly before his first article on economics appeared, contained his epistemological theories. The philosophical principles stated in these two works are carried over into his economic writing with no changes.

Quesnay's associates all looked upon him as a philosopher, as a modern "Socrates" who had established a new school of philosophy to refute the "Sophists" of France. Indeed it would be striking if they had considered his economic treatises as anything more than the developments of philosophical principles, for economics had not yet become a distinct science. None of the four *éloges* on Quesnay specifically mentions his economic treatises. Instead he is referred to in one as the master of "cette morale général des sociétés,"¹⁴ and in another as a master of the three fields of medicine, philosophy and politics.¹⁵

Unlike modern economists Quesnay and his associates always endeavored to start with first principles and to deduce from them inescapable conclusions. An almost exclusive reliance on this method was, indeed, one of their principal weaknesses, for they refused to allow for the contingencies of social organization or to make room for

¹¹ *Un physiocrate oublié* (Paris: 1905), pp. 44-45.

¹² "Mémoire du M. Eugène Daire sur la doctrine des physiocrates," *Journal des économistes*, XVIII (1847), 137.

¹³ DuPont's preface to Quesnay's "Le droit naturel," *Journal de l'agriculture, du commerce et des finances*, Sept., 1765. Reprinted in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 605.

¹⁴ G. H. Romace, marquis de Mesmon, "Eloge de François Quesnay," in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

¹⁵ Comte d'Albon, "Eloge historique de M. Quesnay," *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

the inductive, statistical aspect of economics that DuPont refers to contemptuously as mere "un recueil de calculs."¹⁶ Their official journal, the *Éphémérides*, went so far as explicitly to condemn the inductive method advocated at the time by the Italian criminologist and economist, Beccaria.

We can know these sciences [the moral, political, and economic sciences comprising physiocracy] in their full extent, because their fundamental principles are by nature quite evident to those who wish to reflect a bit, and sometimes even despite ourselves. In applying ourselves to a thorough knowledge of these principles and always taking them as our point of departure, we arrive easily and with the greatest certitude at their most distant conclusions: an inevitably clear logic conducts us there rapidly by a series of incontestable deductions.¹⁷

In the same organ Mirabeau had a year before explicitly compared his method of arriving at truth with that of Montesquieu and arrived at the conclusion that the two had nothing in common. "We follow neither the same plan nor the same doctrine. He turns his speculations towards established laws. . . . It is nature herself, or the constitutive essence of the laws, preserved from all arbitrariness and all human fraud, that I consider."¹⁸ Le Mercier explained his method thus: "I do not lay my eyes on any nation or any country in particular; I seek to describe things such as they should be in essence, without bothering how they are or how they have been in any country whatsoever."¹⁹ And again he observes: "As truth exists by itself and is the same in all places and all times, so by reasoning and examination we can arrive at it and all the practical consequences which result from it."²⁰

NATURAL LAW THE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMICS

The Physiocrats, then, were primarily philosophers and for them economics was a branch of moral philosophy. Even a casual reading of their works should suffice to indicate this subordination of economics to ethics. Abbé Baudeau, for example, entitles the work in which he summarizes the entire physiocratic system *Introduction à la philosophie économique*. His "résumé général" includes the principles on which this economic philosophy is based, after which he states, "Voilà le droit naturel et la philosophie morale."²¹ This study can be perfected, he insists, only by "instruction in 'morale économique', that is to say instruction in the natural law of justice in its essence."²²

¹⁶ "Correspondence de DuPont de Nemours avec J.-B. Say," *Physiocrates*, edited by Eugène Daire, p. 396.

¹⁷ *Éphémérides du citoyen*, 1769, VI, 62.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1768, VI, pp. 11-12.

¹⁹ *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* (London: 1767), I, 194.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ In Daire, *Physiocrates*, p. 819.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 820.

Quesnay indicates how economics, politics and sociology should all be part of moral philosophy, according to physiocratic ideals, when he describes the arrangement in China, that country which he believed came the closest in the world to the ideal order of the Physiocrats.

These sacred books [of U-King, whereby China was supposed to be governed] include a complete *ensemble* of religion and the government of the empire, of civil and political laws; both are dictated irrevocably by the natural law, the study of which is very searching and is, indeed, the capital object of the sovereign and scholars charged with the details of administration.²³

When DuPont sought to collect the writings that had served for his instruction and would form a complete synthesis of physiocracy, he placed Quesnay's "Le droit naturel" first as a summary of the primary principles upon which this science was based. This was the first article which he had published in the *Journal de l'agriculture, du commerce et des finances* when he took over the editorship of that publication in 1765. By way of introduction to this article DuPont sought to point out the relationship which economics bears toward philosophy according to physiocratic principles.

It is the knowledge of the order and of natural and physical laws which should serve as the basis of economics. We cannot repeat this too often to our readers, because this great, fundamental truth, seen in all its consequences, clears away popular prejudices and all captious reasoning that false contrivances and unrestrained interests have introduced into a science where error is so dangerous. And with a little reflection one can see with certitude that the sovereign laws of nature include the essential principles of the economic order. . . . Here [Quesnay's article on natural law] is the solid base on which the edifice should be erected: we hope never to lose sight of the fundamental truths established there.²⁴

DuPont spent a great part of his later life in fighting to keep these "vérités fondamentales" before the public as "la base solide" on which to erect the edifice of economics. His fight was, of course, a losing fight, for even during his lifetime economics came to be accepted as the science of wealth. It is against this new concept of economics and in defense of the older physiocratic concept that Du Pont wrote J.-B. Say who had defined economics, in the tradition of Adam Smith, as "la science des richesses."

How have you not seen that all the sciences and all the morality of economics were there [in physiocracy]? How have you attempted to split this science in two in order to separate that of wealth, which is only a collection of calculations, from that of the developments appropriate for showing the utility of conforming to the law? The latter was, always has been and always will be everything within the realm of justice, which cannot be violated without injustice, without tyranny, without crime.²⁵

²³ Quesnay, "Despotisme de la Chine," in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 605.

²⁴ Quoted in Oncken, *Ibid.*, pp. 362-363.

Economics for DuPont, then, was a moral and a normative science. This is the very meaning of the term "économie politique" as understood in France at the time, DuPont tells Say. He accuses the latter of not speaking French when he tries to include all government affairs under the term "la politique," which is "the science of Machiavelli, of Cardinal Richelieu, of Bonaparte." But *l'économie politique* is that of justice clarified in all its internal and external relations.²⁶

That DuPont sought to defend the concept of economics held by the physiocratic school is evident from their writings. The sub-title of the collection of their works, *Physiocratie*, which served as a definition of their science, was "Constitution naturelle du gouvernement plus avantageux au genre humain." Quesnay himself stated long before DuPont wrote to Say that "the science of economics is nothing but the application of the natural order of government to society."²⁷ In his "Discours de l'éditeur," in which he sums up physiocratic doctrine, DuPont wrote that physiocracy "exposes with certitude the natural rights of men, the natural order of society, and the natural laws which are most advantageous to men assembled in society."²⁸

PHYSIOCRATIC INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL LAW

What, then, did natural law mean to the Physiocrats? It clearly did not mean the Newtonian concept of physical laws, as most critics seem to believe.²⁹ It is true that the Physiocrats did maintain man was subject to such physical laws, but at the same time they insisted he was also subject to *lois morales* which regulated all human activity in accordance with man's nature as a free, intelligent being. Thus Quesnay states specifically, "Les loix naturelles sout ou physiques, ou morales."³⁰ This division appears through all of his writings and is stated specifically several times, particularly in his "Despotisme de la Chine."

It is a division, moreover, which is respected by all the Physiocrats and is implicit in all their writings. A long notice placed at the head of the first number of the *Éphémérides* after the Physiocrats took it over explained their program as a vast synthesis of the natural order, an order governed by physical and moral laws. The physical laws

²⁶ "Correspondance de DuPont de Nemours avec J.-B. Say," *Physiocrates*, p. 396.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

²⁸ "De l'utilité des discussion économiques," *Physiocratie*, IV, 9.

²⁸ "Discours de l'éditeur," *Physiocratie*, I, ii-iii.

²⁹ Harry Elmer Barnes, for example, states: "They derived their basic doctrine from the English Deists and the French *philosophes*, to the effect that social, political, and economic phenomena are governed by the same natural laws that Newton and his associates believed they had proved to rule the physical universe." *An Economic History of the Western World* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937), p. 419.

³⁰ "Le droit naturel," *Physiocratie* (Paris: 1768-9), I, 51.

apply to material things, the article stated, and the moral laws to human beings. Thus man, composed of body and soul, is subject to both physical and moral laws in his activity as a free, intelligent being with a material body. The article went on to say that the *économistes* intended to omit the physical laws governing the universe from their discussion and to concentrate on the laws of the moral and social order.³¹

Natural law, according to the Physiocrats, is based on the nature of things. Every material being, as well as man himself, is subject to the law according to his end and his nature. Le Mercier, in the introduction to his *L'Ordre naturel*, states:

Wherever our knowledge can penetrate we discover an end, and means which are relative to it: we find nothing which is not governed by laws proper to its existence, and which is not organized in a manner to obey these laws in order to acquire, by their help, everything that can be agreeable to its nature and its being, to its mode of existence.³²

Man, therefore, is subject to the physical laws of nature, as are all material things. He is subject to the law of gravitation, to the law of growth and decay, to the laws of sustenance and reproduction. These are physical laws determined by the Creator and they operate according to the nature of man's body. But at the same time man is subject to moral laws which operate according to his nature as a free and intelligent being. "It is of his nature to be free and intelligent," says Quesnay, "although sometimes he is neither the one nor the other."³³ Again, he concludes his article on liberty by saying that "the supreme intelligence has willed that man should be free," and that the natural law must apply to him as a free being.³⁴ It must therefore be moral law by which man is governed in his specifically human activity rather than physical law. For it to be otherwise would be a violation of man's nature. Quesnay sums up this analysis of how the substance of the law is determined according to man's nature, insofar as it applies to him, in these words:

It [the soul] enjoys a freedom during its union with the body which renders it master of its determinations, and it is evidently subject to a higher order and to indispensable laws which are known by the soul and cannot be freely violated without crime and manifest disobedience toward the Supreme Being, whose justice and power should be held in fear by every intelligent creature.

This same freedom makes us believe, in effect, that we are created for an end which necessarily supposes recompenses that we must earn; rewards which are preferable to the pleasures or goods whose enjoyment is pro-

³¹ *Ephémérides du citoyen*, 1767, I, 3-5.

³² Le Mercier, *L'Ordre naturel*, I, xi.

³³ Quesnay, "Le droit naturel," *Physiocratie*, I, 14.

³⁴ Quesnay, "La liberté," in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 758.

tected during this life; because without this end we do not see why the Author of nature has given us the power to transgress laws established with so much wisdom and which all show the will of a sovereign, all-powerful master; if he had not wished us to obey him through our choice . . . the Supreme Being would have subjected us necessarily to the execution of his will; he would have made us act without intelligence or freedom, like the beasts.³⁵

Le Mercier shows himself to be in complete agreement with Quesnay on the nature of natural law as it applies to men. It is evident that he does not consider the natural law to be merely a physical law which men must obey, as beasts obey their instincts, for he says that "we are culpable before God, insofar as we violate this divine order."³⁶ He sums up his conclusions on natural law and the way it applies to man in this paragraph:

- 1) We know this law which is written in all hearts. . . . 2) this law which is given to us by nature, and which we cannot break without crime; 3) this law whose institution is the work of a Wisdom who governs the universe by unchanging regulations; 4) this law which is less a gift of the Divinity than it is Divinity itself, to the extent that transgressing the law is sinning against the Divinity.³⁷

PHILOSOPHICAL AFFINITIES

Physiocracy, as its etymology indicates, was the science of applying this natural law to society. Thus it could be called "the science of constitutions" and "the science of government." Thus it was an all-embracing science which included all man's activity *qua* man and was in no way limited to economics in the contemporary sense of the term. No government is to perform any function other than that of applying and enforcing the natural law. "Neither men nor their governments make the laws," Quesnay states, "nor can they make them. They recognize them as conforming to the supreme reason which governs the universe; they declare them; they carry them over into the *milieu* of society."³⁸ All valid law, therefore, is ultimately an expression of God's will. "Legislative power," wrote Quesnay, "often disputed over by sovereign and nation, belongs primarily to neither; its origin is in the supreme will of the Creator."³⁹ Perfect conformity with natural law was therefore the first *sine qua non* of all valid law.

At least in appearances and in terminology the Physiocrats were much closer to the traditional thought handed down to eighteenth-century Europe from medieval times than they were to the nineteenth-century economists who looked upon them as the predecessors of Adam

³⁵ Quesnay, "De l'immortalité de l'âme," in Oncken, *ibid.*, p. 760.

³⁶ Le Mercier, *L'Ordre naturel*, I, 46.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 434-435.

³⁸ "Maximes du Docteur Quesnay," edited by DuPont. In Daire, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

³⁹ Quesnay, "Despotisme de la Chine," in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

Smith. Their specifically economic theories, as Max Beer has so convincingly shown, were neo-medieval.⁴⁰ But most important of all is the point that Beer completely overlooks: the fact that to the Physiocrats economics was a branch of moral philosophy.

It would be a mistake, however, to identify physiocratic ethics with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas. There is no doubt that the former flowed from the latter and is distinctly less "modern" than is commonly believed. There is no doubt, either, that the Physiocrats were consciously reacting to the earlier modern political and economic philosophy tied up with absolutism and mercantilism. Le Mercier, for example, cites among his few authorities Aristotle, St. Augustine, the gospels, and St. Thomas; he specifically attacks such contemporaries as Montesquieu and Rousseau, together with such earlier "moderns" as Hobbes. But at the same time one cannot avoid discovering the influence of such philosophers as Descartes and Locke, on both of whom the Physiocrats heavily and consciously leaned.

Moreover, the Physiocrats gave a distinctly "modern" twist to their writings on natural law and its application to society by continually stressing the immediate, material sanctions attached to observance of the law. While they were not in any sense utilitarians, they did believe that it was to each individual's immediate and selfish interest to live according to the law. They were, indeed, convinced that this was their great discovery and that when this point could be shown to all men their system would of necessity be adopted. It was in trying to sell justice on utilitarian grounds that the Physiocrats departed most markedly from the scholastic tradition, for, while the Schoolmen would not have denied the ultimate utility of being just, they would never have been so entranced with it as a selling point as were the Physiocrats. Only to this extent can the Physiocrats properly be considered the first "modern" economists.

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⁴⁰ Max Beer, *An Inquiry into Physiocracy* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1939). This book, which Beer claims is the first new interpretation of physiocratic economics since Adam Smith, is the best appraisal of the subject.

**A SECTION-CORRELATION
OF ST. THOMAS' IN ETHICA ARISTOTELIS**
with the Bekker-pages of the Greek text

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

ANYONE who has worked with St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* has been exasperated, no doubt, by the fact that none of the editions gives the Bekker-page numbers which are the universally accepted basis of reference to the works of Aristotle, both in Greek texts and in translations. As a result of this omission, it is difficult to discover the precise passage of the Aristotelian text to which a given section of St. Thomas' commentary refers; and conversely, if one is reading the *Ethics* themselves and wishes to look up what St. Thomas has to say on a particular passage, it is likely to take considerable time and patience to find the desired section. Nor do the chapter divisions within each book of the *Ethics* correspond uniformly with the various *lectiones* of Aquinas' commentary.

The appended list will show at a glance the exact line of Aristotle's text at which each *lectio* of St. Thomas' commentary begins. It has been compiled by collating the *versio antiqua* of the *Ethics* (the Latin translation which St. Thomas used) with the Greek text, as given in Bywater's standard edition, which in the matter of line-references agrees with all modern editions of the *Ethics* in the original or in translation. It is hoped that this list will be of assistance to many scholars in their study of this very great book and its classic philosophical commentary.

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ST. THOMAS, BEGINS WITH LECTIO:	BEKKER PAGE:	ST. THOMAS, BEGINS WITH LECTIO:	BEKKER PAGE:	ST. THOMAS, BEGINS WITH LECTIO:	BEKKER PAGE:
Bk. 1: 1	1094a1		19	1102a5	6
2	1094a18		20	1102a32	7
3	1094b11	Bk. 2: 1	1103a14		8
4	1095a14		2	1103b26	9
5	1095b14		3	1104b3	10
6	1096a11		4	1105a17	11
7	1096a34		5	1105b19	12
8	1096b30		6	1106a14	13
9	1097a15		7	1106b27	14
10	1097b22		8	1107a28	15
11	1098a20		9	1107b21	16
12	1098b9		10	1108b11	17
13	1099a7		11	1109a20	18
14	1099b9	Bk. 3: 1	1109b30		19
15	1100a5		2	1110a19	20
16	1100b7		3	1110b18	21
17	1101a22		4	1111a22	22
18	1101b10		5	1111b4	1119a21

ST. THOMAS, BEGINS WITH
LECTIO: BEKKER PAGE:

Bk. 4: 1	1119b22
2	1120a23
3	1120b24
4	1121a16
5	1121b12
6	1122a18
7	1122b19
8	1123a24
9	1124a4
10	1124b7
11	1125a17
12	1125b1
13	1125b26
14	1126b11
15	1127a13
16	1127b33
17	1128b10
Bk. 5: 1	1129a3
2	1129b11
3	1130a14
4	1130b30
5	1131a29
6	1131b25
7	1132a25
8	1132b21
9	1133a19
10	1133b30
11	1134a17
12	1134b18
13	1135a15
14	1136a10
15	1136b15
16	1137a31
17	1138a3
Bk. 6: 1	1138b18
2	1139a15
3	1139b14
4	1140a24
5	1140b31
6	1141a19
7	1141b23
8	1142a32
9	1142b34
10	1143b18
11	1144b1
Bk. 7: 1	1145a15
2	1145b21
3	1146b8
4	1147b20
5	1148b15
6	1149a24
7	1150a9

ST. THOMAS, BEGINS WITH
LECTIO: BEKKER PAGE:

8	1150b29
9	1151a29
10	1152a6
11	1152b1
12	1152b25
13	1153b1
14	1154a8
Bk. 8: 1	1155a3
2	1155b17
3	1156a6
4	1157a1
5	1157b5
6	1158a1
7	1158b11
8	1159a12
9	1159b25
10	1160a31
11	1161a10
12	1161b11
13	1162a34
14	1163a24
Bk. 9: 1	1163b32
2	1164b22
3	1165a36
4	1166a1
5	1166b30
6	1167a22
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8	1168a28
9	1168b28
10	1169b3
11	1170a13
12	1170b20
13	1171a21
14	1171b29
Bk. 10: 1	1172a19
2	1172b9
3	1173a13
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8	1175b24
9	1176a30
10	1177a12
11	1177b4
12	1178a9
13	1178b33
14	1179a33
15	1180a24
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EDITORS' NOTES

¶ The following announcement has been received from the newly established Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education.

The American Philosophical Association has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for a Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education. The task of the Commission is "to reexamine thoroughly the nature and function of philosophy in higher education and in general culture, and to study ways and means of reorganizing the teaching of philosophy in order to make the contribution of philosophy to the post-war world most effective." The Board of Officers of the Association selected for membership on the Commission the following:

Brand Blanshard, Swarthmore College

Curt J. Ducasse, Brown University

Max C. Otto, University of Wisconsin

Arthur E. Murphy, University of Illinois, Chairman

Charles W. Hendel, Yale University, Secretary

In the terms of the grant liberal education is conceived very broadly. It includes not only education in college and university but also the development of a free and reflective life in the community at large. Thus the work of the Commission is to inquire into the general function of philosophy in the life of the individual and society.

The Commission can best perform so extensive and important a task if it is able to marshal to its aid the combined wisdom of all concerned. It is therefore seeking the views of scholars and teachers in philosophy and wishes especially to get testimony from the various schools of thought. A number of meetings is planned in different parts of the country where not only members of the profession but also others from different walks of life may discuss what philosophy means at present to the community and what it should mean, especially in the days to come. Both the needs of the plain man and citizen and the demands of scholarship are to be considered. Studies will also be made of the following questions: recent trends in professional philosophy during the past twenty-five years; the philosophy that reaches the general public through non-professional channels and literature; the relations of philosophy, science and religion; the role of philosophy in schools of education; the content and method of graduate instruction and training in philosophy; the place of philosophy in proposed reconstructions of the liberal arts curriculum. The Commission will bring together the results of all these studies and consultations into a report that should yield a clearer view of the objectives of philosophical study and teaching today.

All who are in any way concerned are invited to give the Commission the benefit of their views on any of these questions. The Commission will be particularly interested in learning about the courses of study presently offered or planned, special methods of instruction, the nature and extent of collaboration between scholars in philosophy and those in other disciplines, and ways in which philosophy is given a practical bearing on human affairs.

The address of the Secretary is 327 Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

¶ The Secretary of the above named Commission, Charles W. Hendel, has an admirable exegesis of the world-situation with reference to philosophy, and of the particular duties of philosophers in this hour, in his "Agenda For Philosophers," *Fortune*, November, 1943. One could hardly ask a better *status quaestionis* for the work of the Commission. Save for a tangential implication or two, the Neo-Scholastic Thomists will concur with all that the author is stipulating for.

In one passage (page 186) there is reference to "a given, well-shaped, perfected system . . . consolidated into such form that it has all the answers to set men right in the tribulations and wanderings of spirit that afflict the modern world." To the inordinate "boosting" of this system the author rightly objects, as against a threat to freedom of inquiry. For no one has a right to demand of another the acceptance of any doctrine (not even revealed doctrine, unless presented with the rational motives for credence). If there are Thomists who in their enthusiasm have represented their system as a repository of all possible answers, ready-made and to hand (a conception foreign to St. Thomas, who made philosophy a complex of habits—principles of intellection developed from and ordered to the active quest of truth), they should find Dr. Hendel's remarks salutary indeed.

Dr. Hendel's fine spirit of rapprochement is an inspiration. Scholastics especially should be willing to collaborate in the work he is leading. It is fast becoming evident that the study of and collaboration with outside philosophers on the part of the Scholastic is not at all the equivalent of eclectic compromise or dilettantism, but for all parties an undertaking of high profit.¹

¶ Philosophers are increasingly aware that all is not well today in our systems of education, and that a remedy is to be sought somewhere in the direction of more philosophy.² Without questioning the place of metaphysics as an educational architectonic, it would not seem out of place to call attention to a nice bit of educational realism in Thomas' commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (Bk. II, lect. 5):

He [Aristotle] is here showing in what diverse manners personal habit is wont to lead men in their quest for truth. Some, he says, will have nothing presented to them save in the manner of mathematics. This might be the result of an exclusively mathematical background. Yet, habits are

¹ Cf. James Collins, "Olgiati's Conception of Modern Philosophy," *Thought*, XVIII, No. 70 (1943), pp. 478-505—an excellent study.

² See, for example, the recent publications of Hutchins, Maritain, and Nef, reviewed in this issue. See also the findings of a Committee of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, reported briefly by C. M. Perry in the *Journal of Higher Education*, "The Place of Philosophy in Universities" (Vol. XIII, No. 9, pp. 463-470), and Max Black's "The Training of Teachers of Philosophy," (*ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp. 19-24). In this connection the success of the St. John's experiment is highly interesting. Cf. "St. John's, Annapolis—after five years of operation" by L. L. Camp, *Commonweal* (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1: October 22, 1943).

a development of nature; an individual may be simply not equipped by nature with loftiness of intellect, but over-endowed with imagination. Then there are others who require a concrete illustration for every truth that is proposed to them—either because of formed habits or because they are naturally weak of intellect and ruled by the sense-faculties. Others contemn all avenues of learning except those of poetry and authority, requiring, as though distrustful of their own judgment, the decision of some person of established reputation. This too may be laid up to personal habit, or to inability in discerning whether or not a given rational process concludes with certainty. And some require certitude in everything. This indicates power of intellect and judgment, so long as certitude is not sought where it cannot be had. Of those who shrink from prolonged inquiry after certitude, some do so because they cannot grasp in the proper order all the complex elements that enter a reasoning process, and others because they are inclined to become absorbed in minutiae.

These observations, drawn from the experience of two of the greatest teachers of philosophy, are verifiable in almost any undergraduate class. Too, the history of philosophy warns us that attempts to popularize philosophy can result in the substitution of something more popular than philosophic. Metaphysics and theology are not for all; neither are they the exclusive possession of the professional man of these faculties. And a smattering in these studies is worse than no acquaintance at all. It must be determined which of the educandi are capable of going all the way; for the rest there must be an alternative goal other than the attaining of metaphysical wisdom. Otherwise, there is danger of a persistent cleavage between ideal and realization, with a consequent abandonment of the ideal.

The Scholastic rejects as 'anti-intellectual'—on the basis of his own principles—that greater part of modern speculation which presumes the sufficiency of chance or some other non-intelligible force as an ultimate explanatory principle. And he censures the relativistic, non-normative ethical systems being currently formulated. His reason is that if modern philosophers are going to reject the postulate of an intelligible reality and to maintain that the universe has not in itself the principles by which it may be understood, and that consequently whatever of meaning and intelligibility seems to be found in the universe is in some way the projection of the subject seeking to understand, then there is no hope for rapprochement, no common ground at all.

But is this, after all, the real issue? Logically, it is. Metaphysical speculation requires the positing of the principle of intelligibility. But it is also true that the final acceptance of an intelligible reality will depend, for the modern mind, on the results obtainable through this postulate. The first of these results is without doubt the proof for the existence of an Absolute Being. Can we, supposing that being is intelligible, prove the existence of a Being responsible for the intelligibility we seem to find in being? The structure of the *Summa*

(Continued on page sixty-eight)

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MENACE OF THE HERD by Francis S. Campbell. *Bruce Publishing Co.*, 1943. Pp. 398. \$4.00.

Procrustes was the legendary highway man of Attica who tied his victims upon an iron bed, and stretched or cut off their legs to adapt them to its length. Procrustes was slain by Theseus, but his brutal obsession to cut men down or stretch them out to fit a common mold lived on. Calvin and Luther and the other Protestant Revolutionists preached a doctrine that initiated a "Procrustian" levelling process on humanity. Rousseau and the "democratic" philosophers wrote "Procrustian" political philosophy which became articulate in the cry of *égalité* which echoed through the boulevards of Paris, and was reduced to its ultimate but perfectly logical application in the modern totalitarian state.

The Menace of the Herd or Procrustes at Large is the title of Francis Stuart Campbell's latest book. This work is a constructive but outspoken criticism of Western Culture. The extensive travels and exhaustive historical study of the author well equip him for his difficult undertaking. Using the historicogenetic approach Mr. Campbell analyzes the breakdown of the medieval "hierarchical" culture founded on the realization of man's personality and eternal destiny and guaranteeing him liberty, and the growth of our modern "identitarian" culture founded on the atheistic perversion of man as an individual animal which guarantees him *equality* but denies him any destiny other than that of the totalitarian state in which he exists and forbids him the exercise of true liberty. This "identitarian" heresy which demands *equality* to the exclusion of *liberty*, which postulates an atheistic and impersonal destiny to the exclusion of man's personal and immortal destiny with God is *the menace of the herd*.

Within the last five years the leading Scholastic philosophers have published works in the field of political philosophy. The most important of these works written by Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, Gerald Phelan, Walter Farrell, and others is Mr. Maritain's *Scholasticism and Politics*. In this volume the metaphysical truths concerning personality and individuality are enunciated and their application and importance in political philosophy is completely and precisely developed. Mr. Campbell has made this Christian Political Philosophy his own. He employs its principles as a criterion for his diagnosis of the prevailing philosophies of government.

The "herdist's" instinct is an over-development of those aspects of man's nature which constitute him an individual member of a species. It is a pseudo-philosophy founded on the half truth that man is an animal. It is a myopic and atheistic denial of man's rational soul and his immortal personal destiny.

When Mr. Campbell gives the reader an analysis of the Nazi "herdist" movement he demonstrates the multiple influences that prepare the national mind for the acceptance and development of such a philosophy of life. Over-simplification and generalization have been characteristic faults of the majority of works published on this subject. These are faults that the author has avowedly avoided.

The case study on the "Menace of the American Herd" gives the reader two stimulating chapters, chapters which merit serious consideration on the part of those interested in the development of the United States Gov-

ernment. Mr. Campbell's thesis that our American Government can only be preserved if governed by *experts*, professionally trained civil servants, who are representatives of the people—but representatives who will make decisions and enactments in accordance with philosophical and legal principles, as did the representatives and statesmen who framed our Constitution, rather than in accordance with the passing whims and fancies of their constituents—is a thesis that is both practical and truly progressive.

There are many statements throughout the book that will make the reader balk, and become sceptical. There are many that will thrill the reader. But whatever be the emotions that this book will arouse, it will provoke and stimulate thought on political questions.

Although the literary style of this book is popular, the format is scholarly. Numerous footnotes and a generous appendix of "readings" and references give the work an added value. *The Menace of the Herd* is recommended to all students of social studies. It is a book that will be most profitably read with reference books and an Atlas close at hand.

TIMOTHY L. McDONNELL

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EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS by Jacques Maritain. *Yale University Press*, 1943. Pp. 120. \$2.00.

EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM by Robert M. Hutchins. *Louisiana State University Press*, 1943. Pp. 108. \$1.50.

UNIVERSITIES LOOK FOR UNITY by John Ulric Nef. *Pantheon Books, Inc.*, 1943. Pp. 54. \$.50.

There have appeared so many books in the past four years on education and freedom, education and democracy, and education and a post-war world, that one hesitates to recommend more books on the same subject. However these three books should be an inspiration to the student of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy since they present an analysis of American education together with a constructive and unified program based on a true concept of the nature and importance of metaphysics in the formation of students. We have endeavored to educate an entire generation without a morality, a metaphysics or a religion; little wonder that we have produced a society in which materialism—the natural formless philosophy of the uneducated—has reigned supreme; a society in which the only moral basis has been utilitarianism and the only religion the worship of pleasure. The remedy for these mistakes, if we are to win the peace by the restoration of truly cultural and humanistic value in the politics of the Western World, is to restore metaphysics, morality and religion to their proper place in education. Without a metaphysics, man cannot understand the universe and his place in the universe; without morality, man does not have a standard of values; without religion, man has not the inspiration and heroism to seek the absolute despite the material sacrifices involved, nor the courage to retain his standard of values. Education has been predominantly anti-intellectual and society has reaped the logical consequences of anti-intellectualism—an appeal to force and a totalitarian politics. Democracy cannot survive unless nourished by the forces which produced our Western Democracy—metaphysics, morality and religion.

Professor Nef's brochure is a further and more complete development of ideas which he first presented in *The United States and Civilization*. He emphasizes the place of art and philosophy in a humanistic and demo-

cratic education. Dr. Hutchins reasserts the ideas which he championed ten years ago in *Higher Learning in America*, and attempts to justify the latest innovation at Chicago University—the conferring of the A.B. degree after sophomore college. Professor Maritain analyzes American education from a philosophical point of view and endeavors to draw up a curriculum which would restore philosophy, morality and religion to their proper place in American education.

There seems to be one point in which Professor Maritain and Dr. Hutchins depart from their philosophical inspirations and even from the perennial experience of teachers. In fact they produce an insoluble dilemma for themselves and democracy. They maintain that in a Democracy everyone must have a liberal education—by this they understand a college education. Certainly neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas nor anyone who has taught college students would maintain that this is possible. It seems to be a fact of experience that many people, in fact the vast majority, cannot learn philosophy; nor is this because of financial and social conditions, but simply because they are lacking in the native endowments and dispositions to comprehend the subject. If Democracy demands that everyone receive a liberal education, I fear that they have proved that Democracy is a utopian form of government. Professor Nef seems to be more realistic and philosophical on this point, since he recommends different types of education after the elementary school according to a student's interests and disposition.

The Rockefeller Foundation has appointed a Commission to study the Function of Philosophy in a Liberal Education. In the present controversy about education in a post-war world, it is certainly gratifying to know that the viewpoint of Thomistic Philosophy on the subject has been so well presented as it has by these three men. To anyone who is interested in the discussion these three books should certainly prove valuable.

WILLIAM L. WADE

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THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES IN A CATHOLIC SCHOOL by Theodore Brauer and Others. B. Herder Book Co., 1943. Pp. x + 321.
\$2.50.

This book is composed of nine essays by six professors of the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. The purpose of their work is to show the way in which the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas may be used to integrate the various subjects taught in a modern Catholic College. Professor Brauer, who died before the book was published, wrote three of the chapters. He is at his best in the study: "Economic Thought in St. Thomas," (ch. VI). Here, we find a good survey of certain elementary concepts of valuation, of economic and social organization, of the just price, of money and interest, and of the just wage. His more philosophical contributions: "Thomism and Modern Philosophy," (ch. IV), and "The Importance of Teleology," (ch. V), are useful summaries, depending very largely on secondary works, in particular on well-known studies by Maritain, Gilson and Garrigou-Lagrange.

Of the other essays, that by Professor Franz Mueller, "Person and Society According to St. Thomas," (ch. VII) is most striking and controversial. It is based on accurate references to the text of St. Thomas and to modern interpreters, especially in the German school. However, in his zeal to mark off the unique nature of the human person among earthly

beings, Dr. Mueller has written several pages (186-190) on the individuation of the human soul, which are more than a little confusing. To get some notion of the difficulties in this question of the relation of individuality and personality in man, the reader might consult: J. A. Creaveny, "Person and Individual," in *New Scholasticism*, 1943 (XVII) 231-250; and C. De Koninck, *De la primauté du bien commun, contre les personnalistes*, Montreal, 1943.

Chapter II has a very promising title: "St. Thomas on Study," by R. A. Kocourek. However, it turns out to be a translation of the short letter, *De modo studendi* (which is printed with the *Opuscula* of St. Thomas) and a running commentary based on the 17th century exposition by J. P. Nazarius, O.P. Though it has been pointed out (see *Thought*, Sept. 1943) that the authenticity of this letter is not fully established, I see no reason for doubting its authority; both Grabmann and Mandonnet regarded it as probably authentic. My objection to its use would rest on its small intrinsic value. I doubt that its applicability to the condition of the lay student in the modern college is very great. Whether or not it was written by St. Thomas, the letter was intended to guide the clerical student, who would be preparing for ordination in the Order of Friars Preachers. The advice to the student, to keep to himself, to avoid contacts with the world, to shun visiting, must be understood in this context. The present-day lay student might better be reminded of his social and political obligations as a member of an unavoidably worldly society. Moreover, the views of St. Thomas on the life of study are much more thoroughly developed in those sections of the *Summa Theologica* which deal with the intellectual virtues, and particularly in the account of the virtue, *studiositas*. This matter has been very well covered in English by M. Grabmann, "The Scientific Cognition of Truth," in *New Scholasticism*, 1939 (XIII) 1-30, an article to which Prof. Kocourek makes no reference.

The other contributions, "St. Thomas in the Curriculum," by Father J. H. Moynihan, "Religion and the Research of First Principles," by Father W. LeBeau, "St. Thomas and Political Science," by Father C. McCoy, and "St. Thomas and the Development of Modern Science," by J. Giesen, are well written and of general interest, though they are not to be regarded as profound studies of Thomistic thought. As a whole, the book appears to be directed to the elementary student in college and to the person who has little or no knowledge of Thomism. Viewed in the light of this end, as a work of popularization, it is a commendable undertaking.

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LIGHT BEFORE DUSK by Helen Iswolsky. *Longmans, Green and Co.*, 1942. Pp. 253. \$2.50.

For a little while before the armistice with the Axis forces in 1940, there glowed in France a light of Christian religious and social thought, a light that had been struck and was being fed by French writers, artists, and scholars under the inspiration of Catholic teaching. Disaster came in 1940 and 1941, the dusk of defeat and occupation, and only a spark of that thought remained among the persecuted and silent in France and the exiles in the free French zone and alien lands. It does remain, however; the spark is there. And what is likely to endure in present-day and future French reconstruction is based on social action begun by the French Catholic school before 1941.

This is the theme of Helen Iswolsky's book. Living for many years in Paris and near it, Miss Iswolsky, the daughter of the former Russian Ambassador to France, became well acquainted with the religious and social movements in France during the decade that preceded the present war. She knew the leaders of these movements, studied and worked with them, and writes simply and earnestly of their influence and achievements.

As a member of the international intelligentsia and a frequenter of literary and artistic *salons*, Miss Iswolsky served her literary apprenticeship in the sophisticated and exceptionally cultivated and creative Parisian world of Proust, Gide, Claudel, Stravinsky, Prokofieff, and Ravel. Gradually, however, she drifted away from these masters in order to specialize in social and religious questions; she began to feel, she says, that the world of pure literature and pure art could not satisfy her; and she undertook a study of the reunion of the Eastern Churches. As a Russian Orthodox, she visited for a time at the Benedictine monastery of Saint Scholastica. That visit started a chain of circumstances that led to her giving up Orthodoxy and becoming a Catholic of the Eastern rite.

Miss Iswolsky had two interests: the Catholic social movement and the movement for the reunion of the Eastern Churches. Following them, and sometimes uniting them, she came into contact with a now famous group of French and Russian Christian intellectuals, of whom Maritain and Berdiaeff were the leaders. She attended the Maritains' Sunday gatherings at Meudon and saw the beginnings of Jacques Maritain's social action movement. She went also to Berdiaeff's "at homes" and witnessed that his social doctrine was completely in harmony with Catholic social thought. There were many other noted persons and groups whom she came in contact with during her years of observing, studying, and writing in Paris: Charles du Bos, Leon Bloy, Emmanuel Mounier and the *Esprit* associates, the Abbé Cardijn and the *Jocists*, the *Temps Présent* group, and the leaders who received so joyfully the papal encyclicals on social questions. And in her pages the influence of Solovieff, called the Russian Newman, and Charles Péguy is so powerful that they seem to be alive.

During the loud and evil dusk that fell upon France, in the safety of the Pyrenees, Miss Iswolsky watched the exiled members of the Catholic social group reunite and push forward their studies and plans. She left them, convinced that the French Christian humanist tradition, which is serving as a stronghold against despair, will be the foundation for the reconstruction of the French nation.

Though somewhat self-conscious and naive, *Light before Dusk* is valuable in being an introduction to the French Christian intellectuals and a commentary on them by one who knew them well. It has a secondary value as a proof that all France was not material and corrupt before this war. Whoever reads the memoirs of newspaper correspondents and fashionable refugees describing the fall of France should also read *Light before Dusk* that he may see the complete picture of her mind and spirit.

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CHARLES MULLIGAN

THE TWILIGHT OF CIVILIZATION by Jacques Maritain; translated by Lionel Landry. *Sheed and Ward*, 1943. Pp. ix + 65. \$1.50.

This recent publication of M. Maritain need not receive a lengthy review, since it does not represent a new phase of his thought, but is merely a summary restatement of views he has propounded elsewhere, notably in *True Humanism*.

As the title of the work suggests, M. Maritain is concerned here with the chaotic conditions of our day and with their historical causes as these

are to be found in the world of ideas. The source of the present cataclysm, he assures us, is to be traced to the anthropomorphic humanism introduced by the men of the Renaissance; this form of humanism tended to give man a nature and reason shut up in himself and isolated at once from the supernatural and the infra-rational. Such a concept of man could only generate an irrationalist reaction, which began with Luther, was continued by Rousseau, and which today takes the form of racism. The rationalist tendency of anthropomorphic humanism, on the other hand, did not die, but found its adequate expression in the completely temporal—and consequently atheistic—philosophy of Marxism. These two tendencies, the irrationalist represented by Nazism and Fascism, the rationalist by Communism, are the immediate causes of our present confusion. The hope of the world is only in what M. Maritain felicitously terms the humanism of the Incarnation, "a humanism which considers man in the integrality of his natural and supernatural being." This humanism must have a deep concern for the masses, must overcome the divorce between religion and temporal affairs, and must proceed in a spirit of love in opposition to the world which is characterized by hate. Finally, M. Maritain insists that accompanying this humanism must be a Christian-inspired democracy to supplant the democracy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Being only a summary of former positions, *The Twilight of Civilization* could not afford a sufficiently deep insight into the brilliancy of M. Maritain's studies in civilization and culture. The perusal of this book may well be, however, the occasion of further inquiry into the author's more detailed analyses of these our times and of their salvation by the humanism of the Incarnation.

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R. F. SMITH

IS MODERN CULTURE DOOMED? by Andrew J. Krzesinski. *Devin-Adair Co., 1942. Pp. xiv + 158. \$2.00.*

In this book Dr. Krzesinski, while admitting the presence in the modern world of a traditional or Christian stream of culture, deals chiefly with the antitraditional or materialistic culture, which he describes at some length as individualistic, atheistic, hedonistic, and nationalistic, and which, he maintains, is today in a tragic state. This condition, however, need not discourage us because there "remain in materialistic culture itself, calamitous as is its actual state, factors that justify on our part a certain degree of optimism" (p. 129).

These factors are two: first, other nations and cultures have been in tragic states before and have not perished; second, the evident failure of materialism is drawing the world to Christianity. The degree of optimism which these two factors engender is slight indeed—to the first, one is inclined to say *transeat*; to the second a simple *nego*. In the Epilogue the author suggests that a return to Christianity could save Western culture. This is eminently true, but it still leaves the question: what grounds have we to believe that such a return will be made?

The chief value of this book lies in its summary description of the manifold evils to which materialism has led. Since it is such a wide description, the book will need to be supplemented by deeper and profounder analyses of individual points. It is regrettable that the bibliography included in the book is not more of a help in this respect. Had the more penetrating books been accompanied by a critical note telling of their worth, the value of the bibliography would have been considerably increased.

R. F. SMITH

PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE. Selections from Papal Documents. Edited by Harry C. Koenig, S.T.D. Bruce, 1943. Pp. xxv + 894. \$7.50.

Mr. Herbert George Wells has presented his readers with this startling statement: "The world war of 1914-1918 was a unique opportunity for the Papacy; the occasion was manifest for some clear strong voice proclaiming the universal obligation to righteousness, the brotherhood of men, the claims of human welfare over patriotic passion. *No such moral lead was given.*" (Italics mine) We find this unequivocal challenge in his well-circulated *Outline of History*. (Garden City Ed. p. 725). If so eminent a popular historian was at the date of writing unaware that by "an explicit provision of the secret Treaty of London" the representative of the Holy See was deliberately excluded from any participation in the Treaty of Versailles, to what grounds can we lay such astonishing ignorance of the numerous Papal pronouncements on peace which had been given before and during the first World War? No Catholic is unaware of the diabolic anti-religious tone which distorted the map of Europe in 1918, destroying the last great Catholic empire, Austria-Hungary, and placing the hegemony of Balkan Catholics in the hands of a vigorous anti-Catholic minority.

The present volume is presented and endorsed by the Bishop's Committee with high hopes that it will find its way to the library of every statesman and educator of our country. That it is the right and the duty of the Holy Father to speak uncompromisingly on peace is clear to every Catholic. It is equally evident to the unprejudiced non-Catholic that no one else can speak with such authority and vision, because the Pope is most acquainted with the dispositions and needs of nations and he is in no way interested in a policy of temporal aggrandizement, which would obscure an objective diagnosis.

Principles For Peace presents all the important statements of the last five reigning Pontiffs as evidence of their desire to urge without ceasing the fundamental truths of nature and of "Nature's God" as the one necessary norm of international concord. Surely it is clear that peace will never reign until such a time as it is established in harmony with the nature of man himself. And no one knows better than the Church of Christ the nature of man for the simple reason that no one knows better than she the nature of man's relation to God.

Because of the necessity of founding a new world-order "upon justice and upon truth" it seems that it is the duty of every American, and especially of every Catholic, to become acquainted with at least the important sections of this work. But we must realize that most Papal documents are not to be digested at one sitting; they require serious study and application. For this reason it is hoped that the editors will realize the need for a companion volume of explanation and commentary. It is unfortunate, in the opinion of this reviewer, that the price of the present volume puts it out of reach of the ordinary reader. But, let us hope, he may realize the importance of the work to such a degree that a general demand will occasion a reprint in the popular price level.

If then the peace after this war is to be in truth a tranquillity of order, and not merely another interlude between two wars, then those leaders and statesmen whose duty and responsibility it is to formulate the new peace cannot neglect these pronouncements of Christ's Vicars on earth. When the reflective mind considers, and considers seriously, the evils that have dug deep into the European consciousness—evils which we in America have a hard time even to imagine—the prejudices and conflicts before the war, and, since the war, the new and terrible wounds that cry not so much

to be healed as to be avenged, there arises the tremendous question of where these principles for a new peace are to be sought. It is to the neglected light of the Papacy that the world must turn; unless, indeed, we want to be witnesses to the bitter spectacle of a new generation that will cry peace, peace, where there is no peace.

JOSEPH F. COLLINS

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PEACE PLANS AND AMERICAN CHOICES by Arthur C. Millspaugh.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1942. Pp. 107.
\$1.00.

It can be stated without great fear of contradiction that very many far-sighted people in this country are thinking seriously of the peace that will be established at the close of the present conflict. And it also seems true that more genuine concern centers around the framing of this peace and the means of insuring its durability than around the actual winning of the war. The recent Russian successes, England's awakening in North Africa, the constant aerial raids on German industrial and shipping centers, Japanese losses in the South Pacific, and our obvious winning of the battle of production indicate a comforting turn of events. But the same brightness does not characterize thoughts that look to the post-war era in Europe—not to mention Asia and the Far East.

This brief book endeavors to give definite form to various lines of thought dealing with this perplexing problem. If its purpose was enlightenment, it hardly seems to have achieved its purpose. If its aim was to impress on superficial minds the magnitude of the issues, it has succeeded. But it does nothing more.

Five general plans, as well as the possible variations which more than one of them include, are proposed for securing world order after the defeat of the Axis Nations. The essential features of each proposition are stated, followed by arguments for and against. Each proposal is quite clearly outlined, defended well and attacked equally well. The author at no time exhibits partiality or prejudice, for his purpose was to avoid any reflection of his own beliefs.

If I am right in my opinion that people contemplating this post-war problem of reconstruction are looking for enlightened and secure leadership—not that which will deny or minimize the sacrifices that have to be made, the genuine difficulties that confront all men of good will, the truly gigantic task that has to be performed—and for the encouragement that will come from the leadership of constructive thought and action which will achieve ultimate order and success, then this book is of no great assistance.

Dr. Millspaugh has no eye for anything other than the pragmatic, the same pragmatism that separated two world wars by but a single generation. His proposals deal with nothing save pressure or strong-arm tactics. They would at best beat an evil into momentary subjection and not uproot it. As an antidote for one who has read this book it would be well to read Christopher Dawson's *Judgment of the Nations*, or Michael de la Bedoyere's *Christian Crisis*, or Archbishop Spellman's *Road to Victory*. Still better, however, would be an open-minded perusal, with an effort at understanding, of the four messages given to the world by Pope Pius XII on the four Christmas days he has spent as Sovereign Pontiff.

PATRICK J. HOLLORAN

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THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE PAPACY by Kurt F. Reinhardt, Ph.D. *Bruce Publishing Co., 1942. Pp. 26. \$25.*

We find here an excellent summary of the present status of the Papacy with regard to international peace. The treatment is brief, but it gives a good view of the historical approach and of the philosophical and moral issues involved. Dr. Reinhardt is a little negative, perhaps with justification, in his discussion of the reaction to Papal pronouncements on the part of American Catholics. Then too, there is more than one angle involved in American refusal to enter the World Court.

Perhaps the best part of the booklet is the presentation of the Papal peace policy as compared to the points of the Atlantic Charter. Certainly the whole work presents a problem which should be studied and pondered by all Americans. It would be particularly fruitful as a guide for classroom or study-club discussion.

J. F. COLLINS

THE ORIGIN OF DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM by Morton G. White.

Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. xv + 161. \$2.25.

Professor Dewey has been expressing himself in print for sixty years, but to many admirers of his later pragmatic, positivistic stand it will come as a kind of shock to learn that throughout the first twenty years of his publications he held the theory of an antecedent, all-inclusive "universal mind." This he got from his teacher, Morris, and remotely from Hegel. When he went to Chicago and became engrossed in education, and particularly in his "laboratory school," the forerunner of Progressive Education, he exchanged the "universal mind" for a future problematic "goal" (p. 144) of universal evolution. The drive toward the goal makes both man and his environment adapt themselves to one another. Just as in the previous theory, object and individual consciousness were both held in the unifying grip of the "universal mind," so now both are under the sway of evolutionary "Nature," (p. 46).

The present little work is almost entirely about logic, but since Dewey is definitely Hegelian in his method, logic has to be the main theme. Yet the book leaves out much of the real Dewey. His positive contributions to teaching technique are only hinted at in a short chapter on arithmetic. His championship of democracy is scarcely mentioned. We have here only his thought *schemata*; not its gradual evolution, but its sudden mutation from emphasis on the antecedent mind to an all-engrossing concern about the conjectured outcome of the struggle for the survival of the fittest.

Doctor White's study is very enlightening for any one who wishes to discover what Dewey has had "in the back of his head" throughout all his prolific and often baffling publications. But there is no mention of how Dewey's thought has been from the start hemmed in by prejudices against fixed principles and institutionalized religion, against Aristotle and the Scholastics. In that respect there has not been any evolution or sudden mutation in Dewey's thinking.

Instrumentalism was hatched, after ten years of incubation, at the turn of the century. No definition of Instrumentalism is attempted, but here are a few items of description. Thought arises only as an instrument for overcoming obstacles, and is controlled by anticipated results, (pp. 111, 121). A concept simply makes explicit what is implicit in the percept, (pp. 66, 75, 78, 139). An agent is a mode of behavior; it is what it does, (pp. 112, 117). Then exclude all *ab extra* control, subject the thought to the inner control of evolutionary adjustment so that ideas will be "bent"

to suit the facts, and facts become "elastic" to ideas, (pp. 82, 85): this, as nearly as can be said, is Instrumentalism.

J. A. McWILLIAMS

*St. Louis University
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THE RELIGIOUS AVAILABILITY OF WHITEHEAD'S GOD by Stephen Lee Ely. *University of Wisconsin Press*, 1942. Pp. 58. \$1.25.

The *Spiritual Exercises* offer the counsel that "every good Christian ought to be more ready to give a good sense to the doubtful proposition of another than to condemn it." Professor Ely can be said to have followed that counsel; nevertheless he finds Whitehead's concept unsatisfactory. The exposition of the concept is very accurate. Whitehead's God has a "Primordial Nature" and a "Consequent Nature." These however are, according to Ely, only "distinctions of reason." But there is something more fundamental than this "God," and that is the metaphysical ultimate. (p. 11) Between this "ultimate" and the dual nature of God, there seems to be more than a mere distinction of reason. A Scholastic would at once say that the term God should therefore be applied to that ultimate.

Also we have here an interesting parallel with the historical development of the concept of God. For Plato God was deductively the Supreme Good, for Aristotle the Supreme Truth, for St. Thomas the Supreme Existent. With this we might compare Whitehead's "Consequent Nature" (the good), "Primordial Nature" (the true), "Metaphysical Ultimate" (the Necessary Existent). However Whitehead does not extend his term "God" to include the last.

"Religious Availability" in the title of this book means, not a rational acceptance, but only a serviceability for producing the sentiment called "religious." To be "available," Whitehead's God must "comfort" us in enduring the evils of the world. (p. 41) The emphasis is not on a rational solution of the problem of evil, but on a concept, however fashioned, which will serve as a solace and an inspiration. Whitehead, with everyone, takes it for granted that God is good, but in defending Him against responsibility for evil, he saves the goodness by sacrificing the omnipotence—which is the old, trite agnostic solution. God "does the best He can." Professor Ely should have noted that the Christian defense is based primarily on reason; and as for sentiment, surely the deepest and most lasting sentiments are those that have a rational foundation.

J. A. McWILLIAMS.

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WILLIAM JAMES, THE MAN AND THINKER. *University of Wisconsin Press*, 1942. Pp. 147. \$2.00.

IN COMMEMORATION OF WILLIAM JAMES. *Columbia University Press*, 1942. Pp. xii + 239. \$2.75.

These two commemorative volumes present the thoughts and evaluations of leading American non-Scholastic philosophers concerning the life and work of William James. Although none of the papers are epoch-making or intrinsically important, they represent a lively picture of the present state of American non-Scholastic thought. Almost as many philosophical points of view are represented as there are contributors.

The reader of these volumes receives a forceful impression that the great ideals of the war—democracy and the Four Freedoms—are indeed dear to the various writers, but not on any rational grounds. Some go so

far as to maintain that they are objects of "faith" (or more accurately, "trust," as Arnold Metzger correctly calls it in the Columbia volume, p. 217). This statement clearly demonstrates what Scholastics have long held about Pragmatism: that as a philosophy of anything more than the practical intellect it is bankrupt.

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GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ

THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE *translated by F. J. Sheed.
Sheed and Ward, 1943. Pp. xxii + 354. \$3.00.*

It is Mr. Sheed's hope that he has been able to give a "reasonable idea of what St. Augustine said . . . in the English people speak now." I think he has done very well in achieving that hope.

It is well that St. Augustine be put into a more readable and more intelligible form at the present time. The particular reason why this is so today might be expressed in Augustine's own words (as given by Mr. Sheed), when he wrestled with his problem of bringing others to see what he had been brought to see by God's mercy through his mother's prayers and through some industry of his own and much suffering: "The good I now sought was not in things outside of me. . . . For those that find their joy outside them . . . in their starved minds lick shadows," (Book IX, chapter iv, p. 190). That expresses what millions are doing today. And it may be that hundreds will find the answer to their needs by reading this new translation of an ancient, ever new, classic because the language will not bar them from understanding and because their need and Augustine's wizardry—and God's grace—will through this book meet and bear fruit. It is a relief to find no sly notes, no innuendoes, no un-Catholic renderings of this Saint's most Catholic mind and language.

The confessions, as every one ought to know, tell the story of Augustine's life for that period when his life was psychologically, morally and immorally, intellectually and socially spectacular. He lived; he tasted almost everything; he writhed in impatience at his lack of Truth; he rushed headlong into intellectual efforts; he rejoiced in his friends. He questioned—every one and every thing. He tried the modern cliché for a "plan of life": "Think, man; think for yourself!" And he found himself eventually quite bankrupt but stumbling onto a treasure, The Treasure of Infinite Riches because it was the Treasure of Infinite Truth.

Such a book is a greater psychological treasure than any other record that man has ever made of the workings of the human soul. And it is a much richer and a much better theology than any maker of modern compendia of theology could ever contrive.

And now that Mr. Sheed has done his work, that book will be available to so many more. And it will be read by so many more. And it will do its own peculiar work for so many more.

We must be properly grateful to Mr. Sheed for his good work.

*St. Louis University
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BAKEWELL MORRISON

MEDIEVAL STUDIES: VOLUME IV *published for The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. The Garden City Press, Toronto, 1942.
Pp. 297. \$5.00.*

Among the studies of this volume, of special interest to the philosopher are those by Jacques Maritain, J. R. O'Donnell, Imelda Choquette, and Maur Burbach.

M. Maritain's contribution is entitled "Spontanéité et Indépendance," and is an illuminating exposé of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the degrees of autonomous movement as present in the ascending hierarchy of physical, sensitive, and intellectual *natures*, with its culmination in the absolute intellectual freedom of the Divine Nature itself: whose essence is its act of knowledge and its act of love (p. 29).

We are reminded again that Descartes' mechanical conception of nature, which leads to the concept of God as self-causing, falls far short of the Thomistic conception of the Divine Being Who enjoys perfect intellectual freedom and life, because His essence is His act of existence (p. 31). The Thomistic conception of the ascending freedom of *natures* of necessity terminates in the perfect freedom of the Divine Nature, because it is founded on the self-evident fact of the existence of dynamic *natures* in the material universe as present in inanimate as well as animate beings (p. 23).

Imelda Choquette undertakes to show "the relation between dialectics and revelation in St. Anselm of Canterbury." She achieves her purpose admirably in a convincing critique of "*Voluntas, Affectio, and Potestas* in the *Liber de Voluntate* of St. Anselm." Anselm proceeds always by what is well described as the method of "logical realism" and any failure to appreciate this fact will lead to a misunderstanding of his philosophy (p. 76).

There is an excellent study of the philosophical system of Nicholas of Autrecourt, together with an exposition of this philosopher's appraisal of Aristotle, by J. R. O'Donnell. The six Aristotelian theses singled out for criticism by Nicholas in his work *Exigit Ordo* are developed at length. In conclusion, it is contended that Nicholas should "no more be labelled a medieval Hume; it is one thing to deny causality, another to deny its demonstrability" (p. 125).

Maur Burbach gives us an interesting study of "Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation Regarding St. Thomas." The period studied roughly covers the years from 1277, the date of Étienne Tempier's condemnation of certain Averroistic doctrines at Paris, to the time of Pope John XXII's canonization of the Angelic Doctor, who asserted the authority of St. Thomas in the memorable words: "He alone enlightened the Church more than all other doctors" (p. 158).

EDWARD McCARTHY

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THE MARITAIN VOLUME OF THE THOMIST. *Sheed and Ward*, 1943.

Pp. 374. \$3.50.

The January issue of the *Thomist*, which is now put out as an attractively bound volume, was prepared to honor Jacques Maritain on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Those who have contributed to the issue, whatever be their personal views or specialized field of endeavor, have at least this in common that they highly esteem M. Maritain for his "outstanding position in the field of philosophical letters, his tireless labors and courageous thought." It is with full approval and pleasure that we repeat those apt phrases, for Maritain has indeed distinguished himself as an intrepid and indefatigable writer and teacher. The editors indicate that the present volume is also meant to be a tribute to Thomism itself "as the possessor of principles, of enduring truths worthy of any sacrifice and of the utmost loyalty and the hardest battle. . . ." To all of which we can only add a hearty *Amen*.

A birthday celebration is no place for criticism, but some comment seems to be required. For over and above the common bond of universal respect in which the many contributors hold Maritain, there is little else to give unity to the series of articles. Besides a biographical sketch and bibliography, two drawings and a motet, there are summaries of Maritain's thought as regards politics, the sciences, and the place of contemplation in life. These are interspersed between papers on such divergent topics as Edmund Burke's theory of oligarchy, peace, social justice, dogma in Judaism, Catholic revival in French literature, the Thomism of Dante, providence and evolution, art in France and England during the years 1540-1640, the *Nichomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, and the like. It is true that the twenty-four contributors are for the most part well-known American scholars from whom we have come to expect masterful studies. And it is unquestionable that some of the essays do portray insight and careful research. But the fact that several are insignificant and superficial only serves to emphasize the lack of unity in the series. From an objective point of view, the volume would have gained considerably if there were some intrinsic motif unifying the various studies, or if all the articles were of uniformly high quality.

Nevertheless the volume has achieved its purpose of honoring M. Maritain and of conveying a sense of the deep esteem which America tenders him.

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CHARLES L. SWEENEY

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNAL SENSES by Mark A. Gaffney,
S.J., Ph.D. *B. Herder, 1942. Pp. 260. \$2.00.*

If there is a neglected chapter in the field of psychology, it is the study of the distinctive function and nature of the internal senses. Nor should this neglect be altogether surprising. Man is a being of reason. As a consequence, it is difficult for him to appreciate and to investigate the senses as they appear in a purely sentient state, namely, in the animal kingdom. But it is important for man not to forget the excellency of these sentient powers which he possesses in common with the animal. Too many psychologists, ignoring this similitude, construct experiments in problem solving which actually require no more than the internal senses for their solution. Finding that both man and animals are able to resolve them, the conclusion is too often formulated that animal and man differ only in complexity of the same function. The illogical and lamentable feature of such a conclusion is that these psychologists think they have succeeded in either discovering reason in animals or de-rationalizing man in the process. Of course, what actually happened was that reason was not considered at all, because problems were not presented which required the insight of reason for their solution.

The author helps to clear up this issue in his book by presenting a highly interesting and informative study of these four amazing internal senses: common sense, imagination, memory, and instinct. Each chapter contains a wealth of illustration. The style of the book is popular, for the most part. A splendid analysis follows each chapter. For a book of its size and compass, it contains an almost surprising number of references, principally to philosophical and psychological sources. The chapter on instinct is probably the best. Here the author is indebted to the work of Wasmann. Various theories of instinct are presented and criticized; remarkable examples of instinctive behaviour of animals are cited. One might find it a regrettable omission that nothing is said about the cogita-

tive sense in man. Perhaps this was deliberate, since the author is not attempting to show the role of the internal sense in the life of man's intelligence. His point of view and purpose seem to be to present the internal senses, as much as possible, in their purely sentient state.

The reviewer finds it difficult to evaluate this book. It is not a study from the viewpoint of the strictly scientific psychologist; such a one might, therefore, be disappointed in not discovering here the findings of much important experimental research. Neither should the book be considered a strictly philosophical investigation of the nature of the internal senses. Rather, its value for both scientific and philosophical psychologists lies in this: it is a very orderly descriptive study, with splendid illustrative material. On this account, any psychologist will find it a helpful book. The layman, too, will find it interesting and understandable.

FRANCIS J. O'REILLY

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GREEK FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONAL LOGIC by Ernst Kapp.
Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. viii + 95. \$1.50.

Dr. Kapp has given us a good book in a short compass. In the brief span of ninety-odd pages he discusses in an eminently readable way the Greek foundations of traditional logic. To state his purpose is to summarize his achievements, and vice versa. These achievements are the tracing of the several parts of Logic from their starting point in the arguments and discussions of men to their crystallization and formulation in the speech and writing of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

Dr. Kapp does us a service in the fresh light he throws on a number of obscure passages in Aristotle; he does perhaps a greater service in recalling other half-forgotten, but almost more valuable, thoughts to our mind. It will, for instance, be a surprise to many to realize the large part that Plato and to a lesser extent Socrates played in the building of Logic. To Plato, for example, we owe the germ of the dialectical and the sophistical syllogism, the matter of fallacies and many another thing; to Socrates inductive conversation and the universal definition. Aristotle, of course, took all these contributions to himself, developed them, added many another ingredient and fused them all into the Aristotelian Logic that is the basis of much of our modern Logic. Likewise, the position of the *Topics* is made clear; chronologically the first of the Stagirite's logical treatises, it is not nearly so important as the *Prior Analytics*. The syllogism is presented in its true light as being not so much a means of discovering new truths as of finding proofs for conclusions already known. Induction is shown to be of two types, the one "only a way of logical verification of an anticipated statement," the other the better known method of "discovery of principles."

Dr. Kapp's little work is almost wholly on the credit side; on the debit side we might instance what appears to be the narrow field of the authors chosen for citation; for men like St. Thomas Aquinas and John of St. Thomas have much to offer in the matter under discussion.

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HUBERT H. MCKEMIE

HOW TO THINK by Arthur D. Fearon. *College Publishing Company, 1943. Pp. iii + 194. \$1.50 paperbound, \$2.00 clothbound.*

Textbooks of sciences like Biology, Chemistry and Physics are generally supplemented by workbooks or laboratory manuals. Dr. Fearon's *How To*

Think aims to serve the same purpose for the science of Logic. Most texts on Logic content themselves with an orderly exposition and explanation of the laws of thought leaving it to the pupil or teacher to apply them to the actual thinking.

Dr. Fearon reverses the process. By directing the student in his actual thinking he endeavors to produce in him an habitual knowledge and, as it were, an instinctive use of the laws of thought.

The book is intended for everybody over 14 years of age, boys and girls, men and women, high school and college students. Hence the author confines himself to the minimum essentials, as the subtitle also indicates, "How to analyze, associate, memorize, reason." Even within these few topics a bare skeleton is left and a mere mechanical procedure is insisted on. The author promises himself great results from this simplification. The reviewer cannot share his optimism because over-simplification is a fruitful source of error. However as an initiation into the science of Logic, as a beginning in the art of correct thinking, Dr. Fearon's book will serve a useful purpose.

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J. JOSEPH HORST

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION *by*
Franz Mueller. (Aquin Papers: No. 8) *The College of St.
Thomas, St. Paul, Minn., 1942. Pp. 92. \$25.*

Dr. Mueller has added to his brochure on Pesch's doctrine of Solidarism (confer Aquin Papers: No. 7) another contribution to economic study. It is a pamphlet, and yet more than a pamphlet. In pamphlet form, its detailed table of contents, extended bibliography, and searching treatment of one of the most intricate problems of our crusade for an improved socio-economic order, remove from it the note of superficiality which too often we associate with the pamphlet.

The author's purpose is not to select a point in the growth of industrial organization, where centralization becomes disadvantageous and decentralization desirable. Such a problem is beyond the scope of such a work, although we hope that soon Dr. Mueller will turn his pen to a more complete treatment of the subject. The present brochure makes a fine introduction.

Rather, the writer has in view the correction of the fallacious theory that increased centralization and increased rate of profits go hand in hand without qualification. Basing his claims on economic principles, studies of statistical reports, and the authoritative remarks of leading economists on both sides of the Atlantic, he shows how the "law of diminishing returns" applies not only to agriculture, but also finally to industry. He supports his thesis well by the analysis of the added burden placed on proportional costs needed to sustain the higher "fixed" costs in a centralizing industry. His distinction between capitalism as a system and capitalism as an object, in which he follows Fetter and Sombart, is well made.

Much of his argumentation, though, because of its necessarily abbreviated treatment, would not be quite safe from the questionings of one who upholds the benefits of current capitalism. Some of his claims on operating costs might require more substantiation. For this reason, too, we hope that the author will extend the present work.

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JOSEPH B. SCHUYLER

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ABBE CLEMENT BARIBEAU, *Leçons Sociales*. Fides, 1943. Pp. 213. \$80.
- PETER R. BIASIOOTTO, O.F.M., *History of the Development of Devotion to the Holy Name*. St. Anthony Guild Press, 1943. Pp. 189. \$1.50.
- JOHN ELOF BOODIN, *Religion of Tomorrow*. Philosophical Library, 1943. Pp. 189. \$2.50.
- WILLIAM J. BROSNAN, S.J., *God Infinite, The World, and Reason*. Fordham, 1943. Pp. 246. \$2.25.
- SISTER S. M. C., *Children Under Fire*. Longmans, Green & Co., 1943. Pp. 65. \$1.50.
- RALPH W. CHURCH, *Bradley's Dialectic*. Cornell University Press, 1942. Pp. 189. \$2.50.
- PAUL CLAUDEL, *L'Annonce Faite à Marie*. Fides, 1943. Pp. 240. \$1.10.
- ANANDA COOMARASWAMY, *Hinduism and Buddhism*. Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1943. Pp. 86.
- LANE COOPER, *Experiments in Education*. Cornell University Press, 1943. Pp. 176. \$2.50.
- C. J. EUSTACE, *House of Bread*. Longmans, 1943. Pp. 159. \$2.25.
- MARVIN FARBER, *The Foundation of Phenomenology*. Harvard University Press, 1943. Pp. 585. \$6.00.
- GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *The One God*. Herder, 1943. Pp. 763. \$6.00.
- CHARLES F. HARROLD, *A Newman Treasury*. Longmans, 1943. Pp. 404. \$4.00.
- ALCUIN HEIBEL, ed., *Synarchism*. Benedictine Press, 1943. Pp. 123.
- WINGFIELD HOPE, *Life Together*. Sheed & Ward, 1943. Pp. 199. \$2.50.
- WERNER JAEGER, *Humanism and Theology*. Marquette University Press, 1943. Pp. 87. \$1.50.
- BERTRAM E. JESSUP, *Relational Value Meanings*. Oregon University Press. 1943. Pp. 175. \$1.25.
- BERNARD J. KELLY, *The Sacraments and Daily Life*. Sheed & Ward, 1943. Pp. 291. \$3.75.
- P. O. KRISTELLER, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*. Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 441. \$4.50.
- JACQUES MARITAIN, *Art and Poetry*. Philosophical Library, 1943. \$1.75.
— *Rights of Man and The Natural Law*. Scribner's, 1943. Pp. 119. \$1.50.
- MARGARET T. MONRO, *Unlikely Saints*. Longman, 1943. Pp. 220. \$2.50.
- BERTRAM MORRIS, *The Aesthetic Process*, Northwestern University Press, 1943. Pp. 189. \$2.25.
- REINHOLD NIEBUHR, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. Scribner's, 1943. Pp. 328, \$2.75.

- GERARD PETIT, *L'Homme Contemporain et la Problème Social*. Fides, 1941. Pp. 435. \$1.50.
- D. D. RUNES, ed., *20th Century Philosophy*. Philosophical Library, 1943. Pp. 571. \$5.00.
- GEORGE SANTAYANA, *Realms of Being*. Scribner's, 1942. Pp. 862. \$4.00.
- BEN-AMI SCHAFSTEIN, *Roots of Bergson's Philosophy*. Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 156. \$1.75.
- PAUL A. SCHILPP, ed., *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*. Northwestern University Press, 1943. Pp. 717. \$4.00.
- WILMON H. SHELDON, *America's Progressive Philosophy*. Yale University Press, 1942. Pp. 232. \$3.00.
- PAUL SIWEK, S.J., *Le Problème Du Mal*. Desclée, de Brouwer et Cie, Rio de Janeiro, 1942. Pp. 159.
- *La Réincarnation Des Esprits*. Desclée, de Brouwer et Cie, Rio de Janeiro, 1942. Pp. 244.
- SMITH, KNIGHT, FAUST, *Philosophy of American Democracy*. University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. 152. \$2.00.
- ELMER G. SUHR, *Two Currents in the Thought Stream of Europe*. Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. Pp. 469. \$5.00
- RAYMOND TANGHE, *Initiation à la Géographie Humaine*. Fides, 1943. Pp. 198.
- ROGER VARIN, *Collection du Message Français: Le Maréchal Pétain*. Fides, 1943. Pp. 96. \$3.00.
- MAISIE WARD, *Gilbert Keith Chesterton*. Sheed & Ward, 1943. Pp. 700. \$4.50.

(Continued from page fifty-one)

Theologica seems to bear us out that the proof for the existence of God is, psychologically if not logically, the beginning of philosophic wisdom. Once this supreme question is affirmatively passed, we can readily establish the non-relativity of truth, an absolute scale of values, obligation and the normative character of moral science.

In view of these considerations, the efforts now being made in certain Scholastic circles to work out a 'precise and adequate statement' of the proofs for the existence of God are highly to be commended. This is said with no intention of doubting the validity of the formulation of these proofs given by St. Thomas. But since the thirteenth century new complications, new difficulties in the way of metaphysical speculation have arisen—the answers to some of which are as yet only implicit in the principles of St. Thomas. Efforts to formulate anew these proofs will be taken seriously, and it is hoped cooperatively, by all Scholastics conscious of the obligation their heritage imposes upon them in the modern world.

¶ The editors of this journal welcome criticism, comment, impressions and reactions of the reader on anything that may appear in its pages. Also welcome are suggestions of problems the reader would like to see investigated in this journal.

G. V. K.